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1. Introduction  
All states are – in theory – the guarantor of public domestic order, while 
simultaneously constituting a part of the international system of states. An ineffective 
and weak state undermines its function on both levels by failing to provide public 
services to its citizens and being incapable of performing its duties as a member of a 
global order. A fragile statehood not only poses challenges for domestic governance, 
but also has ramifications on the regional and global level (Schneckener 2006:23). In 
spite of its importance, the lack of a state’s ability to conduct its responsibilities was 
by Western governments largely perceived as a matter of internal affairs until the 
1990`s. With the exception of a few extraordinary cases in which interventions for 
humanitarian reasons were deemed necessary, fragile statehood was not perceived as 
an issue of international security policy. After the terrorist acts of 9/11 this has 
changed profoundly through a shift towards a more security-oriented approach to 
international relations. As a consequence, internal conflicts and instability are now 
perceived as a potential threat, directly or indirectly, to global peace and security 
(ibid).  
One of the core challenges in Afghanistan is state building – the development of a 
national government that has the monopoly over the legitimate use of force throughout 
the country. This goal is pursued through efforts of strengthening security institutions 
through a process known as security sector reform (SSR), which is an important 
element of state building. The centralization of authority has been one of President 
Karzai`s most severe challenge – extending the reach of the government and 
redirecting local forces to become constructive contributors to efficient governance. 
The essence of state building lies in either to destroy, include or undermine local 
power brokers in order to gain political authority. Moreover, the logic of state building 
is often founded on the rationale that an emerging system should build on existing 
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structures and that it should be based on socio-cultural contexts.1 The perception that 
bottom-up approaches to state building leads to more viable state systems has emerged 
as a trend in the more recent years, though it is remains disputed. In armed state 
building, strengthening institutions and building foundations for a sustainable and 
well-functioning state is accompanied by counterinsurgency (COIN)2
Involving local communities is commonly cited as a key priority within the peace 
building agenda.
, as is the case of 
Afghanistan. The efforts to “clear”, “hold” and “build” are also founded on success on 
the local level, pursuing a bottom-up approach for sustainability. A functioning 
military force is required to defeat insurgents and “clear” areas in which they have 
been operating. Then, local security forces operating in concert with some sort of 
governance structure to provide rule of law is required to “hold” the area. Finally, after 
clearing and holding a disputed area, conditions are ripe for what is known as post-
conflict reconstruction, or at least to commence the first steps of reconstruction as it is 
not always in the aftermath of conflict.  
3 As this legitimizes external involvement it is believed to provide 
more viable solutions that are tailored to the local context. Karokhail and Schmeidl 
(2006) for instance, argues that a state in Afghanistan can only function if it accepts to 
co-exist with local structures,4
                                              
1 See for instance Seth Kaplan (2009) Rethinking State Building 
 and uses the example of the Tribal Liason Office in 
Loya Paktia to illustrate the possibilities and ways to engage traditional structures into 
the reconstruction process of Afghanistan. It is an increasingly common perception 
that externally assisted SSR and state building should build on pre-existing structures 
2 “Insurgency and counterinsurgency are a complex subset of warfare. (...) insurgency is an organized, protracted 
politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying 
power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, 
political, economic, psychological and civic action taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (Counterinsurgency 
Army Field Manual 3-24).  
3 See for example the United Nations High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure World: 
Our Shared Responsibility  
4 Here understood as tribal structures: “a complex clientelistic network where the importance of family and kinship 
overrules interest-oriented association”.  
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and be tailored to the socio-cultural context.5
In the modern context, post-conflict environments face the challenge of how to deal 
with NSAAs. The roles of NSAAs is nonetheless an understudied subject, and is as a 
consequence not properly understood. By far the most common perception is that 
NSAAs are spoilers of state building processes. This thesis contradicts this notion in 
asking whether NSAAs might in fact play a significant and constructive role in the 
inevitable and persistent insecurity of the post-conflict state. Should, in other words, 
NSAAs be engaged in the provision of security within state-led efforts to effectively 
provide security to the state and its population, or are they merely spoiling the 
democratic top-down process? In order to ensure a sustainable peace and state building 
process, the role of NSAAs in Afghanistan must be part of the equation. This thesis 
explores the potential of NSAAs to act as providers of security on behalf of the 
centralized government in Afghanistan. It does so by asking the following research 
question: 
 However, still relatively unexplored is 
the inclusion of non-state armed actors (NSAAs) in the provision of security. NSAAs 
are commonly referred to as a major challenge for security governance, as they 
undermine the states’ monopoly on the use of force. Yet, NSAAs have throughout 
time maintained spheres of political, economic and military control within states, and 
has arguably had a profound influence on the formation of states.   
 
To what extent can non-state armed actors contribute constructively 
in Security Sector Reform? 
 
Non-state armed actors are in this thesis understood as warlords and militias, 
representing armed actors that operate beyond state control. Security Sector Reform is 
understood as comprehensive formalized efforts to improve the states’ ability to 
effectively provide security to the state and its people. By constructive contribution 
                                              
5 See for example Egnell and Haldén 2008 
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this thesis refers to contributions that enhance the security situation, which is the 
paramount objective of SSR. The research question will be answered by conducting an 
explorative and descriptive case study of Afghanistan, thus, exploring the extent to 
which warlords and militias can contribute constructively in the provision of security 
in Afghanistan.  
This thesis analyses the outcomes of three individual strategies for handling NSAAs 
implemented in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The three strategies in question are 
coercion, or the use of force (and the threat thereof), co-optation, or the offering of 
political positions, and socialization, the creation of common normative foundations 
through local engagement. These approaches reflects Stedman`s (1997) main strategies 
in addressing spoiler problems in peace processes. Each of these three strategies are 
placed within a theoretical framework derived from international relations theory and 
proposed by Schneckener (2009). Coercive disarmament represents realist logic, co-
optation of NSAAs represents institutionalist logic, and socialization represents 
constructivist logic. These three theoretical approaches are based on and distinguished 
by their underlying assumptions about the potential of NSAAs in security governance. 
On the one hand, realism perceives NSAAs as mere spoilers, while institutionalism 
and constructivism on the other hand perceive NSAAs as potential providers of 
security. 
By analysing the outcomes of the three strategies implemented in Afghanistan this 
thesis will contribute to the theoretical debate on whether NSAAs can serve as 
constructive providers of security governance or whether they are mere spoilers. In so 
doing, this analysis also sheds light on how to manage NSAAs in post-conflict 
rebuilding. This study explores the possibility of outsourcing the responsibility of 
security to functional equivalents of statehood that can cushion violent conflicts and 
provide security within the efforts of SSR.   
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1.1 Main findings  
This thesis sets out to explore the extent to which NSAAs can contribute 
constructively to SSR and finds that to characterize the involvement of NSAAs in state 
building and SSR as merely opportunistic and damaging is to offer an analytically 
limited paradigm. As security institutions are often critically weak in the initial period 
of transition from war, assistance from local armed actors in the provision of security 
may in fact greatly benefit state building efforts. More precisely, this thesis finds that 
NSAAs are potential constructive contributors in post-conflict states. This potential 
relies above all on the NSAAs will and ability to contribute, and secondly on whether 
or not it in contributing undergoes a behavioural and motivational change. Despite not 
undergoing such change the contributions of NSAAs may be beneficial in the short 
run, as it leaves room for the strengthening of state institutions while simultaneously 
controlling NSAAs to prevent confrontation. However, this thesis demonstrates that 
co-optation and socialization of NSAAs is more likely to be effective if NSAAs are 
subject to control mechanisms and strategies for how to remove underperforming 
NSAAs. By utilizing the potential in NSAAs as agents of peace and stability, the 
security system created becomes more efficient and tailored to the local context, while 
also allowing the government to map and address local grievances. 
1.2 Thesis outline 
The first chapter of this thesis has introduced the subject under study and explained 
what this thesis sets out to do. The second chapter will present the research 
methodology undertaken in this research paper. The third chapter clarifies the concepts 
used and presents the theoretical framework that the analysis will be conducted within. 
The realist, institutionalist and constructivist theory each represents alternative 
strategies in dealing with NSAAs, and are founded on differing logics on NSAAs as 
spoilers or  constructive contributors in SSR. The forth chapter describes the empirical 
context within which this study will be conducted. Afghanistan, being the case at 
point, will be described based on what has been described in chapter three. The fifth 
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chapter applies the theoretical framework presented in the third chapter to analyse the 
empirical context presented in chapter four. The fifth chapter will analyse the outcome 
of the three strategies used in managing NSAAs in Afghanistan. The lessons drawn 
from this analysis will serve to illuminate the theoretical debate on whether NSAAs 
can play a constructive role as local governance actors or whether they are mere 
spoilers. The sixth chapter, offers concluding remarks and theoretical and political 
implications of the findings. Finally, this thesis concludes by proposing some future 
prospects.  
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2.  Research Methodology 
This chapter presents the research methodology employed in this study, firstly, 
presenting the choice of using a case study, secondly, discussing the validity and 
reliability of the study, finally, presenting the interview design and data used. The 
challenges met during and after conducting the research will be described throughout 
the chapter. This study sets out to study the extent to which NSAAs can contribute 
constructively to SSR in Afghanistan, and will be conducted through a qualitative 
study. The aim of this thesis is to acquire empirical knowledge on the outcome of 
various approaches towards NSAAs by relying on documents, secondary sources and 
eight in-depth interviews. The findings will be analysed to highlight if there is a 
potential in NSAAs to operate as governance actors in the provision of security. To 
arrive at these findings, international relations theory is applied as an analytical tool. 
The theoretical framework offers an analytical framework for improved understanding 
of the underlying logics of the differing approaches towards NSAAs.  
2.1 Case study 
Although there is a substantial scholarly literature both on the concept of SSR and 
Afghanistan, very little research has been conducted on the potential of NSAAs to 
contribute constructively in Afghan SSR. This is, naturally, largely because the main 
focus by NATO and its allies has revolved around eliminating potential spoilers. 
Considering that this study focuses on outcomes still under development, the research 
design is in principle explorative and descriptive. A qualitative approach in this study 
has clear advantages as the field of addressing NSAAs within SSR is still theoretically 
underdeveloped, and the concepts are to some extent vague (Ragin and Meur 
2000:750).  This research is based on an analysis of three cases conducted within the 
single-case study of Afghanistan. The three within-cases are three concrete initiatives 
implemented in an effort to deal with NSAAs. Such a research design allows for 
observation and analysis of within-case variation. The three within-cases are selected 
based on their high degree of resemblance to Stedman’s ideal-types, represented in the 
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theoretical framework. All three within-cases mirror the characteristic of the 
theoretical strategies and its underlying assumptions about the potential of NSAAs in 
the provision of security. By applying a single-case study along with three within-
cases it allows for in-dept knowledge of a complex phenomenon in contextual 
conditions through the use of multiple sources of evidence (Yin 2003:13). 
A case can be defined as “an instance of a class of events” (George and Bennett 
2005:17), and describes the case study approach as “the detailed examination of an 
aspect of a historical event” (ibid: 5). According to Yin (1993), the major rationale for 
using a case study is if the research wants to cover both a particular phenomenon and 
the context within which the phenomenon is occurring. In this case, the phenomenon 
and context constitutes NSAAs and SSR in Afghanistan. The advantage of case studies 
is the ability to use several sources to measure the same phenomenon. It is also 
powerful in the sense that it may lead to the identification of new variables and 
hypothesis, in addition to exploring complex causal mechanisms and relations (George 
and Bennett 2005: 17ff). By using a “small-N” study this thesis is able to acquire 
detailed knowledge about the context by drawing on multiple sources – consequently 
leading to enhanced validity and reliability – as the research provides multiple 
measures of the same phenomenon (Hellevik 1991; Yin 2003).  
The drawback of using case studies is that insufficient information may lead to 
inappropriate results.  Moreover, in this thesis the researcher must take into account 
that there may be a hidden third variable affecting the outcome. Even though X leads 
to Y, there could be a third variable (Z) that influences the outcome (Bryman 
1988:31). Acknowledging that correlation not necessarily means causality and being 
aware of possible third variables is important in this study.         
Although the objectives of this thesis is to contribute to knowledge about the extent to 
which NSAAs can contribute constructively to SSR by studying the outcome of 
various strategies in managing NSAAs, the process under study is currently 
undergoing and therefore the conclusion drawn must be regarded as tentative rather 
than assertive. Nevertheless, tentative conclusions based on documents, interviews and 
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secondary sources may provide valuable indication of the actual outcomes of various 
approaches towards NSAAs. Thus, ultimately contributing important knowledge to an 
area relatively unexplored, but nonetheless important.   
Understanding the complexity of the Afghan society and it`s local security structures is 
crucial to improve the Afghan and international efforts to reform the security sector 
and to bring stability to the war torn country. Hence, the choice of Afghanistan as case 
is one of importance.  The aim of the study is further to contribute in improved 
knowledge on SSR as such, as peace and stability operations are today more complex 
and ambitious than ever before. External actors not only intervene with a UN mandate 
to keep or to enforce the peace, but they also subsequently aim to create a stable state 
able to provide security effectively to its population.  
In order to ensure the relevance and trustworthiness of the study, specific 
methodological criteria must be adapted to the research in question. Therefore, the 
following section will pay particular attention to the questions of validity and 
reliability.           
2.2 What is relevant to measure?  
A challenge when studying SSR and NSAAs is that there is not necessarily only one 
definition of the concepts. Therefore, making sure the informants had the same 
perception of what the SSR comprises; a necessary assurance was to initiate the 
interviews with discussion about the concept itself. Clarification was also necessary 
about the concept of NSAAs, as there are numerous actors operating in the complex 
landscape of Afghanistan. To control for this uncertainty, the interviewees were asked 
to define how they understood the concepts, and subsequently to reflect upon the 
potential of NSAAs as governance actors.  
Measurement validity, also known as concept validity, refers to if the study 
“meaningfully captures the ideas contained in the corresponding concept” (Adcock 
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and Collier 2001:530). Put simply, is this thesis measuring what it is supposed to 
measure?  
It is important to conduct a study that is free of random errors, which also secures the 
reliability of the study (Hoyle et al. 2002:83). Hoyle et al. (2002) underlines the 
importance of concept validity, which aims to make sure that the operationalization 
reflects the concept in use by the researcher. Therefore, concepts used in this study has 
been considered. In this thesis the choice of concepts are linked to the aim of the study, 
and the context of which the research is taking place. This is in line with the argument 
proposed by Adcock and Collier (2001) on how to choose the right concept.   
The dependent variable this thesis analyses is the outcomes of different governmental 
strategies towards NSAAs in SSR. These changes are identified from analyzing 
official documents and reports, secondary sources and interviews. The independent 
variable or the different approaches towards NSAA – which are presented in an 
analytical framework of international relations theory – is operationalized as three 
concrete initiatives implemented in Afghanistan. This will provide for a high degree of 
precision and quality of measurement.  
In order to answer the question of whether or not NSAAs can contribute constructively 
to SSR this thesis investigates the extent to which they contribute to the paramount 
objective of SSR, namely an improved security situation. This is in this thesis the main 
indicator of NSAAs constructive contributions to SSR. However, as NSAAs are per 
definition exerting power, often armed, outside the realm of the state itself it 
challenges the states’ monopoly on the use of force. The second key indicator in this 
thesis is accordingly the NSAAs ability to contribute to improved security without 
undermining the legitimacy of the state and its monopoly on the use of force. 
A potential challenge that could have affected the validity of this thesis is the fact that 
three differing strategies in dealing with NSAAs are used on two different NSAAs, 
namely warlords and militias. This could create a false analogy, meaning a research 
comparing two cases that cannot validly be compared. However, as warlords and 
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militias in this thesis are defined as NSAAs, they both represent actors that are 
challenging the states monopoly on violence. As this thesis investigates to what extent 
untraditional providers of security can contribute constructively in SSR, the 
differences between warlords and militias in the two within-cases is not important. 
Furthermore, the significant division between the three within-cases is not necessarily 
the differing strategies per se, rather it is the line of separation between their 
underlying logic on whether NSAAs can contribute constructively in the provision of 
security or if they are mere spoilers.         
External validity addresses the issue of whether or not the findings can be generalized 
beyond the case study. This thesis studies the outcome of various strategies in 
addressing NSAAs to analyse to what extent NSAAs can contribute constructively in 
the Afghan SSR. Even though this is an in-depth study of the case Afghanistan, 
NSAAs in other post-conflict countries may have similar characteristic. Moreover, 
several lessons learned from the outcome of SSR-initiatives may be applicable to other 
post-conflict cases. The research conducted seeks also to offer a framework on how to 
engage with NSAAs and explores the possibilities of outsourcing security governance. 
Hence, it could be possible to apply the lessons learned from Afghanistan to similar 
cases undergoing a process of reforming the security sector in a security environment 
made up of NSAAs.    
2.3 Can the empirical data be trusted? 
Reliability relates to whether or not the study is replicable, that is to say, if another 
researcher conducts the same study will the same results be obtained (Willis 2007:216; 
Yin 2003:7). The reliability of the official documents used is reasonably high, and so 
are many of the secondary sources which are based on extensive fieldwork. Regarding 
the interviews, a tape recorder was used in all of them except from the one in the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry. All informants accepted and were comfortable with a tape 
recorder being used before the interview started. After the interview, a summary was 
written and if requested sent to the informant to make sure that the essence was 
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captured. Before the interviews were initiated, the subject of the research was 
presented, without revealing the questions to be posed. The interviews were semi-
structured, which strengthen the reliability of the data, as it opens for cross-referencing 
information and facts between the different interviewees. Taking into consideration 
that a triangulation of interviews, documents and secondary sources has been 
conducted, that secondary sources and documents are easily accessible, and that 
interview notes are available upon request, this thesis should yield a high degree of 
reliability. 
2.4 Interview design   
The interview design in this research is largely in line with the design proposed by 
Rubin and Rubin (1995). The interview was semi-structured, entailing that a list of 
questions was prepared but not followed systematically. Rather, leaving room for 
probing and follow-up questions as the conversation proceeded. The design remained 
flexible throughout the study allowing new ideas to emerge during the interview. The 
set of questions also remained flexible as the interviewees had different knowledge 
about distinct parts of the subject, hence, adjusting the questions to fit their knowledge 
and experience. A point of remembrance when not using a detailed interview guide is 
to be aware of not loosing control over the topic and the format of the interview, as it 
may become easy to digress and become sidetracked with anecdotes and generally 
inappropriate information (Kajornboon 2005:5). Knowing that the method in use is not 
free from methodological issues leads the researcher to be aware of important 
questions, such as how to avoid posing leading questions, how to know if the 
informant is speaking the truth, and how to analyze the interview afterwards.    
Being able to conduct fieldwork would have strengthened the insight on the initiatives 
executed in the SSR-process and the actual outcomes. An opportunity to visit 
Afghanistan during the research would have made it possible to conduct interviews 
and increase the understanding of the process and the outcome of approaches towards 
NSAAs. Due to the security situation, and the lack of facilitation to conduct fieldwork, 
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such opportunity failed to occur. Hence, the research is based on interviews with 
informants that have served for an extended period in Afghanistan, including military 
personnel, experts, researchers, policy makers and political advisors of various 
nationalities.     
As Kidder, Judd and Smith (1991) suggests, non-probability sampling is beneficial 
when the consideration of the relationship between the sample and the population is 
less important. When the goal of a study is to obtain information about specific events 
and processes; the “testimony concerning key processes is collected from the central 
players involved. In such circumstances, random sampling would be a hindrance rather 
than a help, as the most important actors of interest may be excluded by chance” 
(Tansey 2007:767). Tansey continues by identifying four different types of non-
probability sampling – each with varying rules for selecting the final sample – 
convenience sampling, quota sampling, purposive sampling and snowball/chain 
referral sampling (ibid). As they are not mutually exclusive, this study uses a 
combination of the two latter approaches. First, through purposive sampling 
respondents were identified and sampled based on who were most appropriate or 
available. This implies informants with excessive knowledge about the topic and with 
extensive experience from Afghanistan. These informants include people who have 
worked in political processes, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or as 
researchers on the subject. Then, after identifying the initial set of relevant respondent, 
other potential interviewees were suggested by the first group of respondents – 
functioning in line with the snowball/chain-referral sampling.     
Rubin and Rubin emphasises the need to “build a relationship with the interviewee and 
the importance of having visible cues in a conversation” (Rubin and Rubin 1995:141). 
However, as fieldwork was not a part of this study, and some of the informants were 
abroad, some telephonic interviews were conducted. Contact was initially established 
and a written appointment made, before the actual interview was carried out. In such 
manner, they were prepared, knew the project and had set aside time for a long 
conversation. In some of the cases the interviewee was acquainted with the researcher, 
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and a relationship as outlined above was already established, they could then be 
contacted and interviewed either in person or by telephone.   
In this study, preparing for interviews involved reading academic literature on 
Afghanistan, reading official reports and documents from the GIROA, ISAF and 
UNAMA on the developments in SSR, and finally to attend seminars on Afghanistan. 
Working as Executive Officer at the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, leading the 
Afghanistan-project, allowed for the arrangement of seminars and workshops on 
Afghanistan issues. In addition, this lead to a broader network and the establishment of 
contact with relevant people in the Norwegian Armed Forces who has served in 
Afghanistan, personnel from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), and researchers with relevant experience and in-dept 
knowledge. Having the affiliation with the Norwegian Atlantic Committee facilitated 
the arrangement of meetings abroad, as was the case in Japan and with the foreign SSR 
and/or Afghanistan experts. Later, the transference to an Advisory position at the 
Embassy of Afghanistan in Oslo, only contributed to the benefits earlier experienced.       
In total, eight informants were interviewed, in addition to several “loose 
conversations” on the subject. Underrepresented in the selection were Afghan decision 
makers and NSAAs in Afghanistan. It would have been beneficial to include these two 
groups, however, the security situation did not allow for it. The informants were asked 
three introductory questions, followed by seventeen main questions. Depending on the 
position of the informant, its experience from Afghanistan or the development of the 
conversation, additional questions were posed.       
2.5 Data  
The topic of this study, the potential in NSAAs to contribute constructively in SSR and 
strategies in dealing with NSAAs, is not a theme widely researched and in Afghanistan 
it is mainly an ongoing process. This makes the collection of data somewhat 
challenging. Hence, dealing with this kind of challenges can partly be done by using 
triangulation. Methodological triangulation involves confirmation across three 
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different data collection methods (Willis 2002:219), in this study involving interviews, 
documents and secondary sources. “The rational for this strategy is that it flaws of one 
method are often the strengths of another, and by combining methods, observers can 
achieve the best of each, while overcoming theirs unique deficiencies” (Denzin 
1970:308). However, the researcher needs to be aware of the differentiation of 
different types of data, and to not fall into the trap of treating data superficially even 
though data triangulation may produce large amounts of data. Triangulation can also 
be conducted across different types of informants, for instance civilian and military 
personnel, government officials and other experts. In sum, triangulation improves the 
precision in research findings through cross-reference.  
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3. Theoretical Framework and 
Definitions  
This chapter will present the central concepts used in this thesis. To clearly present and 
define the concepts and terms used in this study is important to create a common 
understanding of the analysis that follows. The most central concepts in use are 
NSAAs, who are the targeted subjects, and SSR, which is the framework for 
addressing NSAAs. Furthermore, this chapter creates an analytical framework for the 
forthcoming empirical analysis by introducing the three differing strategies on how to 
deal with NSAAs, all found within international relations theory.  
3.1 Security sector reform  
Security sector reform (SSR) as a concept has emerged since the late 1990`s as a 
response to the increasing necessity to include security actors within the framework of 
post-conflict reconstruction and state building. SSR has become a central focus to 
prevent states from relapsing into chaos. The rebuilding of effective and accountable 
security institutions is increasingly becoming a priority and considered a basic 
precondition for sustainable peace building. In October 1999, the UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan referred to the concept of good governance and claimed that 
“another very important aspect is the reform of public services – including the security 
sector – which should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and 
accountability as other services” (Annan 1999:5). He thereby made a strong case for 
security sector reform.    
It is debatable what actually constitutes the security sector. Traditionally the security 
sector has been made up of the military, the police, intelligence, border and customs 
guards and all other formal state institutions with mandates and mission to secure its 
citizens. However, the security sector is by the OECD-DAC defined as “including all 
those institutions, groups, organisations and individuals – both state and non-state – 
 17 
 
that have a stake in security and justice provision” (OECD-DAC 2007:22). In adhering 
to this definition, this thesis will explore a broader definition of the security sector 
where NSAAs may contribute constructively in the provision of security.  
SSR gathers several reforms under one policy concept aiming at strengthening not 
only the security institutions but also their oversight bodies and control mechanisms. It 
integrates all partial reforms such as defence, police, intelligence and justice reform, 
which have all traditionally been evaluated and implemented separately (Hanggi 
2004:5). SSR is a holistic process “to enhance the operational effectiveness of the 
security forces with the need to ensure democratic civilian control of the sector” 
(Sedra 2008: 159). SSR, in other words, strives to reconstruct the security sector in 
order to successfully provide security to the state and its people. 
When SSR is conducted in a post conflict context it is often assisted by external actors. 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) offers an authoritative principle on the overall 
objective of such external assistance. The objective is to “increase the ability of partner 
countries to meet the range of security and justice challenges they face, in a manner 
consistent with democratic norms, and sound principles of governance and the rule of 
law” (OECD 2007:21). It is, however, worth underlining that also developed and 
stable states are under pressure of SSR, specifically with the new security 
requirements after 9/11. However, developed states do not face the challenge of 
handling the remnants of the past like in the cases of post-conflict rebuilding, which 
includes efforts of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former 
combatants. DDR is widely recognized as a core element of SSR in post-conflict 
states. 
There is tension between a liberal-institutional approach to SSR, which is based on the 
belief that there exists a universal set of principles and structures of ideal security 
governance, and a communitarian view that believes that programmes must be 
carefully tailored to local context and realities on the ground (Donais 2009:122). The 
former approach has for long been the prevalent, while the latter is slowly gaining 
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foothold. This study explores a communitarian view of security governance in which 
SSR is tailored to the pre-existing security structures found in Afghanistan.  
Within the concept of SSR, the impact (negative and positive) of NSAAs must be 
considered in order to facilitate sustainable peace building. Reforming the security 
sector in post-conflict host nations requires a sophisticated understanding of state and 
non-state actors and their interconnectivity. Understanding how to address NSAAs, the 
potential outcome of the approach chosen to address them, and the prospect for 
NSAAs to function as constructive actors in security governance – are all significant 
issues within SSR.       
3.2 Non-state armed actors 
NSAAs have always accompanied wars and societies ravaged by violent conflict, and 
have traditionally been seen as the principal opponent of a states’ monopoly on the use 
of force. Societies characterized by numerous actors challenging the traditional notion 
of a state possessing the monopoly of violence has first and foremost been a result of 
the states’ inability to supply the population with the security needed. Corbridge 
(2005) offers a helpful definition of how local security providers can be seen; as 
“bundles of everyday institutions and forms of rule” that has emerged as a result of 
conflict. The concept of non-state actor refers to an entity that is not actually a state. In 
the specific context of post-conflict peace building, the expression non-state armed 
actor is being used to refer to a range of armed groups that operates beyond state 
control (Holmqvist 2005:45; Clapham 2009) and could include rebel groups, warlords, 
militias, and political-military parties. However, for the purpose of this paper this 
thesis will exclude rebel and insurgency groups.  
3.2.1 Spoilers or potential governance actors?   
Since the establishment of what we today know as states, the exertion of power has 
combated NSAAs or incorporated them into the state structure. NSAAs are in other 
words not a new challenge for governments. Nonetheless, it has increasingly become a 
 19 
 
crucial issue for successful externally assisted post-conflict reconstruction to engage 
with such actors in one way or another.  
The role of NSAAs is dominated by the perspective that these groups are rebels that 
constitute a problem for the state authority. They are “spoilers” to use Stedman`s 
(1997) terminology, meaning that they show no interest in state stability due to a range 
of political and socio-economic reasons. NSAAs constitute a threat to human security 
through direct violence (armed attacks, rape, killings) or indirect violence (forced 
displacement, enslavement or destruction of property), or through economic 
exploitation of the civilian population (Holmqvist 2005:47). They not only contribute 
to violence and conflict, but they also make it difficult to restore peace and conduct 
post-conflict state building. NSAAs may directly affect the efforts of external actors 
through for example hostage taking or plundering of humanitarian aid. 
This thesis explores NSAAs as potential governance actors. In the absence of a 
centralized monopolization of violence, NSAAs may emerge as an alternative logic of 
governance. They might be able to serve as providers of public goods and security in 
provincial areas outside of reach and influence of the centralized state. They may, in 
other words, “provide stability and fill the functions of a state in areas of limited 
statehood, even though the distribution of goods may be based on patron-client 
relationships” (Schneckener 2006:7). Concerns may arise as they are not necessarily 
accountable to any authority, and they often function beyond the checks and balances 
of the state. Furthermore, NSAAs may easily establish economic zones that are outside 
of the governments’ revenue thereby challenging the legitimacy of the state. Still, there 
might be a chance that NSAAs may operate as a part of the solution and a resource in 
peace and state-building processes. This could constitutes what can be referred to as 
transnational security governance, where armed groups like warlords and militias 
cooperate with international actors in providing security for the population.  
Perceiving NSAAs as spoilers or potential governance actors would entail the 
provision of different strategies. The first would call for containment and coercive 
means, as NSAAs are perceived as spoilers. The other perspective, perceiving NSAA 
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as potential governance actors, would entail addressing them with co-optation, 
negotiation and socialization (Schenckener 2006:8).  
3.3 Options for dealing with non-state armed actors 
There is little consistency in the way the international community deals with NSAAs. 
The work of Stedman (1997) is central in the discussion on former commanders and 
combatants becoming spoilers of peace processes. He suggests three main strategies 
for approaching the problem of spoilers of peace processes. The first strategy is 
coercion, the use of force (or the threat of using it). The second strategy is inducement 
(in this thesis referred to as co-optation), offering NSAAs political positions. The third 
strategy is socialization, building a common normative foundation through local 
engagement. Schneckener (2009) has created a theoretical framework for these three 
strategies that will be employed in this thesis. Clearly, it is difficult to provide a 
standardized answer on how to deal with NSAAs, as context-specific approaches will 
always be necessary. However, by using international relations theory it is possible to 
provide various interpretations for the different strategic options. International 
relations theory provides a conceptual framework that facilitates the understanding of 
events and approaches in politics. According to a realist approach, the most efficient 
way to deal with NSAA is through hard power means, such as elimination, 
suppression by force or coercive disarmament. An institutionalist approach would 
consider it more efficient to alter the interest of the actors through co-optation. A 
constructivist perspective would emphasise the change in norms through interaction 
and the establishment of initiatives inspired by local security structures (Schneckener 
2009:19). The different schools of thought provide a set of explanations on how 
NSAA-strategies can be interpreted. It also builds on an underlying assumption – 
either positive or negative – regarding the possibility of behavioural change, ranging 
from on the one hand not believing in the receptiveness of NSAA to change and 
therefore utilising force, and on the other hand to build on a positive perception and 
believing the effectiveness of influence. This reflects the perception of whether it is 
beneficial to draw on the potential of local security actors in a decentralized system of 
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security governance, or if they are merely spoilers that cannot contribute in 
governance.  
3.3.1  Realist approach: coercive disarmament  
The realist approach suggests NSAAs should be addressed by coercive means 
(Schneckener 2009:20). Realism emphasises the role of power and interest in politics 
and international relations, and the constraints imposed by the egoistic human nature. 
As Machiavelli states, “it must be taken for granted that all men are wicked and that 
they will always give vent to the malignity that is their minds when opportunity offers” 
(Machiavelli [1513] 1970:112). This defines, according to realists, the problem of 
politics and leads to the need for controlling human nature. The international 
community is an anarchic system, and therefore the “law of the jungle still prevails” 
(Schuman 1941:9). These assumptions lead the realist approach to believe that NSAAs 
are mere spoilers and must be addressed through coercion.  This includes the direct use 
of force by deploying armed forces to fight rebel groups, implementing international 
sanctions, or using coercive disarmament or coercive diplomacy, including the threat 
of force to punish non-compliance (George 2003:VII). Other means within the realist 
approach includes control and containment, marginalization and isolation, split and 
rivalry, bribery and blackmail. However, due to the scope of this paper the realist 
approach will in this thesis mainly describe realism through coercive disarmament in 
Afghanistan as this is the initiative that has most accessible data.  
Coercive disarmament is defined as the purposeful and strategic use of incentives, 
such as wealth or lucrative positions, and threat to influence the target`s decision to 
retain a particular class or classes of weapons. In other words, coercive disarmament 
seeks to use threats and incentives to convince the targeted actor to disarm. Coercive 
disarmament intends to affect the military capabilities of the target, and to affect its 
motivation to pursue a certain course of action. Paradoxically, arms are means of self-
defence and a mean to limit vulnerability to threats, while coercive disarmament seeks 
to use threats and incentives to make NSAAs give up their means that provides 
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protection against such threats (Martin 2006:2ff). Therefore, coercive disarmament is 
seldom initiated as an isolated measure, as it is believed that the disarmament process 
needs to be accompanied by the provision of security and economic guarantees.6
3.3.2 Institutionalist approach: co-optation 
 
Hence, relying on the realist approach towards NSAAs often encompasses coercive 
disarmament paired with sequenced processes of demobilisation and reintegration. 
DDR is an important part of post-conflict SSR, and closely linked to the importance of 
strengthening the army, police, ministries and the judiciary sector. These are all 
institutions that are important in filling the power vacuums after disarmament and 
providing security and justice (Rubin 2003:3).    
Institutionalism suggests that common interests motivate states and NSAAs, and that 
states therefore could benefit from co-opting local armed actors into the government 
(Nee 2003:31). One can derive an underlying conviction that NSAAs has the potential 
to be utilized as governance actors within the institutionalist approach. Schneckener 
(2009) identifies some measures in dealing with NSAAs which falls within the 
institutionalist approach, encompassing mediation, negotiation, co-optation and 
integration. However, for the purpose of this paper the institutionalist approach will be 
described through co-optation of warlords into the Afghan government.     
Some scholars argue that states can be founded on today’s NSAAs, as NSAAs may 
serve as a source of future stability. For instance, in the classical discussion of Mancur 
Olson (1998) he explains how warlords seize territory and provide security within 
them. Warlords becomes “stationary bandits” that protects against “roving bandits” 
and who encourage people to engage in local investment. Moreover, Charles Tilly 
(1985) implies that kings who founded the modern state were merely medieval 
warlords who were successful and able to provide security for a population within a 
                                              
6 See for instance Doolan, Shane R (2008): Coercive Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Can it 
be Successful? Naval Post-graduate School: Monterey, CA 
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given territory. From this, and other contemporary scholars like Jones (2009), it is 
possible to extract reasoning that co-opting warlords into the government may be a 
feasible solution to security issues such as those present in Afghanistan. 
The institutionalist approach holds that material entitlement and economic incentives 
can be offered and power redistributed through co-optation and integration of NSAAs. 
Such a strategy seeks to include pre-existing security structures into the political 
setting. There are a number of strategies of co-optation and inclusion, ranging from 
power-sharing agreements, various kinds of decentralised federalism, to incremental 
integration of NSAAs into the centralized state system (Schneckener 2009:22ff). Co-
optation and inclusion could change the behaviour and motivation of the newly 
included actors, leading warlords to gain political legitimacy and consequently seizing 
to be a warlord. Through this alteration, warlords would become governance actors 
representing the people and acting on behalf of the state. The institutionalist approach 
builds on the assumption that NSAAs are operating based on grievance and political 
demands, and that an agreement satisfying both parties can be reached by granting 
NSAAs access to formal decision-making structures. Through co-optation warlords 
can then address their grievance and political demands through the formal structures. 
The government can deal with powerful local actors and create a system that includes 
local actors and represents the public. David Mitrany (1975) suggests that “functional 
agencies”, such as the international community, could organize cooperation among 
conflicting actors. External actors can shape actors preferences by structuring 
incentives, redistributing power and facilitate co-optation.    
3.3.3 Constructivist approach: socialization 
The constructivist approach suggests using socialization as a mean for addressing 
NSAAs, paired with amnesty, and “naming and shaming”. NSAAs and the 
government will, according to the logic of this theory, become intertwined through 
interaction (Schneckener 2009:23). The constructivist approach is based on the 
assumption that that NSAAs can contribute constructively in SSR. This thesis will 
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analyze a constructivist initiative based on socialization in the case-study that follows, 
leaving the two remaining means for further research.   
Constructivism in international relations theory emphasises social interaction and 
communication in society (Adler 2002:99). Based on the concept of learning, 
cooperation develops into the institutionalization of values. In other word, interaction 
between actors is believed to cause a convergence of interests and development of 
common values. The constructivist focal point is the social construction of reality; 
through interaction, actors create their identity and interest, and it is therefore the 
causal power of the process that leads to the shaping of a common reality (Jackson 
2007:164ff).  
Through a process of interacting between the state and NSAAs the latter will be 
socialized, and develop an acceptance of certain norms and values based on collective 
learning. It will become increasingly difficult for NSAAs to rebel and to break out of 
the new commitments. In the end, NSAAs are likely to benefit in economic terms 
through the socialization with the formal government structures. The constructive 
approach, in sum, emphasise assimilation of armed groups to accept certain norms 
(Schneckener 2009:23).  
At first glance, the instituionalist and constructivist approach may seem overlapping, 
but although they do share some characteristics, such as the notion of a change of 
motivation and behaviour through interaction, they do differ on other aspects. For the 
purpose of preventing any confusion the difference will be clarified. The 
institutionalist approach addresses NSAAs by co-opting them into the government 
thereby granting them access to the decision-making mechanisms. In such way, they 
will become a part of the government through a process of socialization which reduce 
their warlord characteristics. The constructivist approach addresses NSAAs by 
creating structures which are based on local security systems. In pursuing a 
constructivist approach the government will initiate new security structures based on 
pre-existing structures, or by supporting those operating on the ground. Consequently, 
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a bottom-up approach is created by relying on local mechanisms. This decentralized 
effort develops a institutionalization of common values and convergence of interest.       
The strategies available in dealing with NSAAs and their theoretical anchor are 
summed up in table 1. In addition, the three empirical cases from Afghanistan are 
placed according to their affiliation. The following chapter is dedicated to these 
empirical cases.  
 
Table 1: Approaches for dealing with non-state armed actors 
Approach Coercive disarmament Co-optation Socialization 
Theoretical anchor Realism Institutionalism Constructivism 
Empirical case Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) 
Co-optation of warlords Local militia programs 
 
3.4 Summary   
In this chapter SSR has been defined as a holistic process to improve the security 
situation. SSR is in this thesis understood as a comprehensive approach to address 
potential threats to security, and to strengthen the security sectors ability to provide 
security to the state and its people. What constitutes the security sector has been 
presented in this chapter, illustrating that this thesis explores the potential of creating a 
security sector made up of untraditional providers of security. An NSAA is defined as 
an armed actor operating outside of the control of the state, and will be the subject in 
focus when later analyzing the different approaches chosen in the case study. Finally, 
this chapter presented a theoretical framework for analyzing the approaches towards 
NSAAs. Within international relations theory, three approaches are found; the realist 
approach (coercion), the institutionalist approach (co-optation) and the constructivist 
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approach (socialization). Whereas this chapter has dealt with the theoretical aspects of 
this analysis, the following chapter is empirical of character. It will present the NSAAs 
in Afghanistan and the different approaches within the theoretical framework of 
realism, institutionalism and constructivism that have been initiated in Afghanistan. By 
referring to the theoretical and conceptual framework presented in this chapter, the 
empirical evidence presented in the following chapter will allow for an in-depth 
analysis of the governance potential of NSAAs in Afghanistan. 
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4. A Case-Study of Afghanistan  
This chapter serves as an outline of typologies and cases of SSR in Afghanistan. This 
chapter is initiated by outlining a typology of NSAAs in Afghanistan developed by 
Michael Bhatia (2008). The three cases of SSR in Afghanistan chosen for this research 
target two of Bhatia’s three types and will be presented empirically. The three cases 
within the case of Afghanistan will finally be categorized according to their respective 
theoretical affiliation. 
4.1 A typology of non-state armed actors in 
Afghanistan 
Afghan armed groups are very large in numbers and inherently diverse, and thus 
difficult to categorize without conglomeration into too broad and generalized 
stereotypes.7
The three cases of SSR-initiatives in Afghanistan chosen for this research are selected 
based on the theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter. These initiatives 
mirror realistic, institutionalistic, and constructivistic initiatives respectively. They do 
however not represent initiatives targeting all three “ideal types” specifically. As 
Bhatia (2008) explains in his typology, all three types can be considered as hybrid 
 There is no one single type of armed group or militia operating in 
Afghanistan. A simplification is nevertheless useful in the analysis of the local Afghan 
security structures. Bhatia (2008) develops a simplified typology of the complex 
security picture in Afghanistan. Three “ideal types” of armed groups are presented, 
namely warlords, community militias, and political-military organizations known as 
tanzims. These ideal types differ across a number of variables such as in structure, 
source of authority and legitimacy, recruitment, relationships with local communities, 
distribution of weapons, economy, and type of activities.  
                                              
7 International Institute of Strategic Studies estimates around 1 800 NSAAs were operating in Afghanistan in 2005, 
with a total member number of as many as 100 000 (IISS 2005). Barron (2005) categorizes 100 NSAAs as dangerous.  
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types, and they may move from one category to another. Warlords and militias are 
often part of political-military parties. However, their membership may be challenging 
to map and their political affiliation is not relevant for the question this thesis sets out 
to explore. Consequently, the third type, the tanzims, will not receive further attention 
in this research.  
The following paragraphs present and define the two types that are subject to analysis 
in this thesis, namely warlords and militias. 
4.1.1 Warlords 
The term warlord refers in this thesis to an individual that enjoys local legitimacy and 
autonomy from the state, a charismatic and patrimonial military leader that controls an 
army that enjoys a monopoly on the use of violence in a given area. According to 
Daniel Birò (2006), warlords emerge as an alternative logic of governance as a result 
of the absence of centralized monopolization of violence. Hence, warlords can 
potentially emerge as a “proto-state builder” that provides services like security and 
other public goods. Warlords depend on personal armies to control territory, to 
increase their influence, and to gain respect either through the threat of force or 
through the provision of security. The respect these armies create increases chances of 
establishing loyalty – the foundation of patron-client relationships – between warlords 
and local communities. The warlords depend on loyal combatants to safeguard their 
military abilities. These combatants are associated with the warlords along hierarchic 
orders of membership. Warlords often have broad networks of connections in all levels 
of society, not only in local terms but also in the provincial and national governments, 
regionally and internationally. This broad variety in networks and connections on all 
levels is according to Jackson (2003) a key characteristic of warlords. Another 
characteristic of warlords is that they do not enjoy political legitimacy, but rather 
military legitimacy in their respective territories. By acquiring some level of political 
legitimacy warlords would by definition seize to be warlords (Giustozzi 2009a:8).  
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Two types of warlords figure in Afghanistan, and they are distinguished on two 
variables. First, warlords are distinguished on their scope of influence, and second by 
their position in the local community. This thesis operates with a wider understanding 
of warlords, covering both types of warlords. Variation across these variables will 
consequently not be given further attention. 
4.1.2 Local militias 
In Afghanistan, many armed groups are best characterized as local or community 
militias. The term militia refers to a body of ordinary citizens, armed and organized for 
military service. A militia represents, in other words, an unauthorized militarized 
group. Giustozzi defines militia as “irregular or semi-regular formations, generally 
local or regional in character, semi-trained or not trained at all, subject to a less formal 
discipline than regular armed forces, and often not even wearing a uniform” (Giustozzi 
2000:198). The advantages of such formations are the low operational costs, easy 
recruitment and effectiveness in mobilization (Giustozzi 2000:198). Local militias are 
commonly subject to control mechanisms, either the checks and balances of the 
community of elders, or subject to control by warlords. Bhatia remarks that militias 
under warlord control are likely to pursue personal gains by way of violence rather 
than operating for the provision of public goods for the community (Bhatia 2008:89). 
Local militias can take several shapes and forms, and the Arbakai represents merely 
one of many. There is however, reason to believe that the southeastern based Arbakai 
have some defining characteristics that enables it to be especially successful in the 
provision of security to its community. The Arbakai is based on the customary tribal 
code of conduct of the Pashtuns – the Pashtunwali.8
                                              
8 Pasthunwali – “the way of the Pashtun” – refers to the ancient code of honor of the Pasthuns. The Pashtunwali is 
integrated in the Pasthun identity and society, and is based on nine principles; hospitality, asylum, justice, bravery, 
loyalty, righteousness, trust in God, dignity and honor of women (Kakar 2005).   
 Its tasks and functions include the 
implementation of the decisions of the jirga, the maintenance of law and order, and the 
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defence of local boarders.9
4.2 Security sector reform in Afghanistan 
 The jirga determines the number of arbakai required to 
achieve their goals, and which members of a given society are suited to become one. 
For matters of defence and collective security a Chega, or common call, is issued, 
calling for all people to participate in the collective defence of their constituency. The 
enlarged armed force resulting from the Chega is referred to as a Lashkar (Tariq 2008: 
2ff). 
SSR is commonly perceived as the foundation upon which the whole state building 
process in Afghanistan depends. SSR was a central component of the road map for 
peace and stability in Afghanistan agreed to at Bonn in 2001, where high-ranking 
Afghans met under UN auspices to decide on how to govern and rebuild the country. 
The Bonn Conference resulted in the creation of a transitional government, a new 
constitution and the decision to hold elections to the Afghan presidency in September 
2004. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was created 
to contribute to development and state building efforts. Priority in the road map was 
given to Afghan leadership, at least de jure, and the international community chose a 
“light footprint” approach. The argument for such an approach was that national 
leadership is believed to be crucial for long-term success in state building (Ayub et al. 
2009).  
Afghanistan`s security sector reform process was launched with two security donor 
meetings in Geneva the spring of 2002. The SSR in Afghanistan was divided into five 
pillars: i) military reform, ii) police reform, iii) judicial reform, iv) disarmament, 
                                              
9 Jirga refers to a “gathering of people”, and is a traditional institution and gathering of Afghans where authoritative 
decisions are made. It often functions as a mechanism for conflict resolution and social order. Jirga is commonly 
perceived as a Pasthun tribal institution, but similar mechanisms are found in other areas among Tajiks, Hazaras and 
Uzbeks. Then referred to as Shura (Wardak 2003). Similarities between the Jirga and the Shura are evident, but Carter 
and Connor (1989) finds that the Shura diverges from the strongly institutional and egalitarian Jirga, in it being more a 
short-term advisory council of elders, landlords, khans, and more recently by military commanders and warlords.   
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demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and v) counter-narcotics.10 Each pillar was to 
be overseen by a lead-donor nation, and was later to be replaced by an Afghan-led 
system following the interim period of training and mentoring.11
Within the holistic approach of reforming the security sector lays the challenge of how 
to cope with NSAAs, and how to address those who defy the state’s monopoly on the 
use of force. In Afghanistan, where NSAAs are numerous, developing strategic 
options for how to address NSAAs is a key issue. By considering the latent security 
governance potential of NSAAs this thesis explores a comprehensive approach to 
security and stability in Afghanistan. 
 This thesis researches 
SSR as a concept, a concept aiming to improve the national governments ability to 
provide security to the state and its people. It does so by identifying and analyzing 
three cases representing SSR efforts in Afghanistan. While the first within-case of this 
research, DDR, happens to represent one of the five pillars of SSR in Afghanistan this 
thesis maintains an understanding of SSR abstract from its specific contextual 
structure. The five-pillar structure will therefore not be given any further attention. 
In the remaining parts of this chapter the three cases of SSR-initiatives in Afghanistan 
will be presented. Each initiative represents and refers to the logic of one of the 
theoretical approaches outlined in the previous chapter. In this respect, the coercive 
disarmament initiative represents a realist approach; the co-optation of warlords 
initiative represents an institutionalist approach; and finally the creation of militias 
initiative represents a constructivist approach. 
 
                                              
10 Sedra (telephonic interview on 17th of July 2009  ) points to the slow strengthening of institutions in Afghanistan as 
an indicator of that the five pillar system has not produced the intended effects. 
11 According to Shinichi Kobayashi, the Assistant Director of the Afghanistan section at the Ministry of Affairs 
(interviewed in Tokyo, December 9th 2009), the lead nation approach is in practice not existing anymore, as all 
contributing partners have different projects within several pillars. Japan has, for instance, initiated efforts on police 
reform. reform. contributing partners have different projects within several pillars. Japan has, for instance, initiated 
efforts on police reform. 
 32 
 
4.2.1 Case I: Coercive disarmament of NSAAs 
From a realist approach to SSR, NSAAs should be addressed by coercion as there is a 
need to control the urge for power and selfish interests which constitute the foundation 
of human nature. NSAAs should, according to this approach, be persuaded to disarm 
through the use of threats and incentives. Coercive disarmament is often initiated 
through a program consisting of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR). In Afghanistan, DDR has been identified as the number one priority to 
increase the personal security of Afghans.12 The objective of DDR is to demilitarize 
the country by disarming and demobilizing NSAAs in order to ensure that the 
Government and the Afghan National Army (ANA) exercise monopoly of the use of 
violence. While the Bonn Agreement created the roadmap for peace and stability in 
Afghanistan, SSR and DDR in particular was not emphasized until the Afghanistan 
Compact of 2003. Japan, as the donor country for DDR, was slow to initiate any 
efforts on the disarmament programme due to the reluctance of the Afghan Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) to undertake any structural reforms, a prerequisite set by Japan to 
release the funds.13
After a few unsuccessful efforts, an ambitious DDR program named Afghanistan New 
Beginnings Program (ANBP) was initiated in October 2003. The program was under 
the administration of the UN who assisted the Afghan Government in striving to 
disarm 60,000 combatants over a period of three years. Financial compensation was 
provided as an incentive to submit weapons. In theory, reintegration of former NSAAs 
was intended to commence two weeks after initiating the demobilization phase.
 A DDR unit was not established until 2003, 11 months after the 
Geneva conference. Subsequently, the Japanese Government gradually devolved 
responsibility of overseeing the process to the United NationsAssistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) (Sedra 2003a:5; Sedra 2008:127ff).   
14
                                              
12 See the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (2003:2) “Speaking out: Afghan Opinions on Rights and 
Responsibilities”  
 
13 The UN and the donor countries wanted to include DDR in the agreement, but the United Front (Northern Alliance) 
opposed the idea of being stripped of weaponry (Sedra 2003:5).   
14 The number was initially 100.000 but was later adjusted to 60.000. 
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Through the Commander Incentives Programme (CIP), commanders were offered 
USD 550-650 in a monthly stipend for a two-year period, supplemented by 
opportunities for travel and training overseas. In addition, suitable candidates were 
offered positions in the government (Sedra 2008:129). The ex-combatants were to 
select a reintegration option for themselves – either agriculture, vocational training, 
small business training, teaching, demining or to join ANA or the Afghan National 
Police (ANP) to mention a few (Rossi and Giustozzi 2006:8). The ANBP identified 
and pursued two reintegration strategy focal points: “first, the possibilities for isolating 
and engaging commanders in legitimate enterprise; and second, employment and 
training opportunities for the ex-soldier” (Sherman 2005:7). 
According to the ANBP the program disarmed approximately 63,380 and collected 
somewhere close to 70,000 weapons (Rossi and Giustozzi 2006:4). The weapons 
collected did however represent a mere 56 percent of the amount of weapons 
registered.15 This suggests that militiamen were able to hand in as little as possible, 
and reports indicated that the quality of the submitted weapons was very low (ibid). In 
fact, Dr. Kenji Isezaki, who led the Japanese DDR unit, characterized most of the 
collected weapons as “junk”.16
Another weakness in the DDR efforts was according to Isezaki (2009) the double 
standards and the rush for benchmarks and results. By 2004, no more than 10% of the 
DDR process was accomplished, and the strengthening of the ANP and ANA was 
 Isezaki also claimed that the efforts of disarming and 
dismantling security actors had a regional bias and that the process led to a large 
security vacuum in large parts of Afghanistan (Isezaki 2009). As the national security 
forces lacked the capabilities to create security buffers in disarmed parts of the country 
other opportunistic armed groups met little or no resistance in filling the emerging 
power and security vacuums.  
                                              
15 The weapons are usually considered the private property of the commanders, rather than the soldier. As the 
commanding officers has not been willing to reveal the number weapons in possession, an exact estimate has been 
difficult to make (Sherman 2005:10). 
16 Personal Interview in Tokyo on 16th of December 2009 
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proceeding slowly. As the Afghan Presidential elections were approaching, the Bush 
administration insisted that the elections could not proceed until the DDR process was 
finalized. At the same time, the administration maintained that not holding the 
presidential elections would be a breach of the constitution. The Bush administration 
was in other words eager for progress in the DDR and consequently sped up the 
program despite warnings of its prematurity. The accelerated process resulted in the 
Afghan presidential elections being held, which provided evidence of progress being 
made in Afghanistan. However, the accelerated DDR-efforts would in the long run 
prove to have counterproductive effects. The sped-up DDR-efforts impacted 
particularly negative on the reintegration part of the program, as it made it even more 
difficult to find alternatives to fighting. 
It may be argued that reintegration is the most important part of DDR as it ascertains 
that militiamen do not fall back into their dependency on commanders. However, 
according to Strand (2008) this most important part of DDR appears to have been 
poorly implemented in the ANBP, as the program by no means was able to guarantee 
employment for disarmed parties. It proved difficult to find and create sufficient 
amount of jobs to the Afghans, who in many cases had served in militias absent 
alternative employment. The “success” or “failure” of DDR is usually measured by the 
quantity of weapons collected while ignoring the equally important social aspect; the 
economic and social integration of former combatants (Rossi and Giustozzi 2006:3). 
Adding to the complexity is the challenging task of targeting the mid-level 
commanders. These commanders, who have benefited from the war through drug 
trade, extortion and other criminal activity, are often feared by the people, and are by 
many perceived as unsuited for army or police service.  In addition, mid-level 
commanders are more difficult to map and track than top-level commanders and 
warlords as they less frequently hold central positions “visible” to the outsider (Rubin 
2003:43; Bhatia and Muggha 2008:133).  
Despite meeting several challenges under adverse conditions, the “ANBP was well 
designed and marked a breakthrough in the SSR” (Sedra 2003a:20).  It also achieved 
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its mandate regarding the number of weapons collected and ex-combatants disarmed. 
Nevertheless, the Afghan Government estimated that there were at the end of ADBP 
still 1,870 illegal armed groups, comprising approximately 129,000 members, which 
fell outside of the mandate of the ANBP (Sedra 2008:135). Those mid-level leaders 
enjoying membership close to the centre and most trusted by the commander were 
often kept away from the DDR-process by their leaders. This consequently led to 
major gaps in the disarmament process. As a consequence of this deficiency the 
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) was initiated in 2005, a DDR-program 
targeting particularly those who fell outside the ANBP, but also tribal militias, 
community defence forces, warlord militias and criminal gangs. Many of these groups 
were difficult to identify, as they are commonly non-uniformed and makes efforts to 
conceal their weapons (Sherman 2005:11). The central role of the Arbakai in 
providing security was recognized through the exclusion of community militias from 
the DIAG programme (Bhatia 2008:91). 
4.2.2 Case II: Co-optation of warlords  
The institutionalist approach suggests handling NSAAs by initiatives aiming at co-
opting them into the formal governmental structures. According to this approach, 
NSAAs will through co-optation and accommodation undergo a behavioural and 
motivational change, enabling them to serve successfully as governance actors. 
Andrew Bacevich (2009) argues that since real influence in Afghanistan is found 
among tribal leaders and warlords, US efforts in Afghanistan should be decentralized 
and outsourced, offering governmental positions and economic incentives and basing 
their efforts on local leaders. In Afghanistan, co-optation of warlords has been a 
common endeavour, both on the initiative of Karzai and NATO. 
The coalition forces gave its support to warlords in the Northern Alliance in the initial 
phase of the intervention in 2001. A strategy was created to co-opt local commanders 
in the new governance structure in an effort of reducing the military and political 
opposition to the international engagement and the recently initiated peace process. 
 36 
 
Just a few months after the intervention in Afghanistan warlords were emerging as the 
new rulers. Warlords were included in the government when the reconstruction began 
and had influence on the Loya Jirga that established the constitution of Afghanistan 
(Marten 2009). 
Karzai has since he came to power co-opted a number of local power brokers into the 
formal governance structures. Karzai managed to co-opt warlords like Ismail Khan and 
Rashid Dostum by coaxing them away from their regional power bases. Karzai 
embraced a policy of accommodation and co-optation during the interim and 
transitional periods. Karzai was reluctant to challenge the status quo, and received 
neither support nor pressure from NATO do so (Middlebrook and Sedra 2005). 
However, Karzai later came under pressure from the international community and the 
parliament to remove prominent warlords involved in the illicit economy or implicated 
in human right abuses. One of the changes made during the 2004 presidential election 
was the removal of the Minister of Defence Marshall Fahim, who in the eyes of many 
had destructed the demilitarization process. The new Minister engaged in a process of 
opening the Ministry to new reforms and gave a boost to the demilitarization process 
(ibid).  
Another one of Karzais co-optives is Dostum, a powerful northern warlord with a 
record of human right abuses dating back to Afghanistan`s civil war in the 1990`s. 
While Dostum was offered and accepted the position of Deputy Defence Minister he 
spent very little time governing in Kabul. Rather, he was preoccupied fighting for 
supremacy in and around Mazar-e Sharif. His opponents for supremacy included 
forces loyal to the current governor of Balkh Province, Atta Mohammad Noor (Tarzi 
2006). Governor Noor is himself a warlord who earned his title in 2005 by virtue of 
his alignment with Karzai. He has been able to maintain a monopoly on the use of 
violence as well as control over illicit activity such as drugs trade by appointing his 
militia clients to powerful positions throughout the provincial administration 
(Mukhopadhyay 2009:11). By employing informal power and rules as well as personal 
networks to preserve control over Balkh, Noor has unlike many other warlords proven 
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quite successful in providing security, reconstruction and counternarcotics initiatives 
in his province. The two examples presented by Dostum and Noor illustrates that 
warlords in Afghanistan do differ, as one has proven to be able to serve the people 
while the other one has been accountable to none. 
4.2.3 Case III: Socialization of local militias   
The constructivist approach suggests using socialization to address NSAAs. Through 
the use of social interaction, based on the concept of learning, interaction is believed to 
develop into the institutionalization of values. By creating structures that resemble 
familiar systems to the local actors, NSAAs and the government will become 
intertwined through interaction. Rather than co-opting actors into the government, the 
governments adjust to the realities on the ground by creating systems that are familiar 
to the NSAAs. Through social interaction a process of assimilation will develop into 
the institutionalization of common values. Informal and formal security governance 
structures will converge and become intertwined, ultimately developing into 
exclusively formal structures (Schneckener 2009:23). In Afghanistan, this process has 
been executed through the creation or support of militias based on the Arbakai 
structure that has been able to provide security in some of the Pashtun areas.      
Jones (2009) argues that power has in Afghanistan been based on local governance. He 
refers to the Musahiban dynasty (1929-1978) where Zahir Shah, Nadir Shah and 
Daoud Khan ruled the country through the most stable period in modern Afghan 
history. This has partly to do with their understanding of the importance of local 
power. They believed in competent government and a strong army, but established a 
tribal engagement strategy in the Pasthun areas of Afghanistan. Zhahir Shah also 
engaged the Arbakai for the establishment of order and for local defence under control 
of legitimate tribal institutions. In this manner a bottom-up approach to governance 
developed, establishing law and order building on local security structures. Adhering 
to the historical reference in Afghanistan, a constructivist approach may appear 
reasonable. Nonetheless, when the SSR process was initiated, the existence of the 
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Arbakai structure became a matter of controversy as efforts to build on existing 
security structures was initiated through the creation and armament of militias (Tariq 
2008:1).  
Even though history illustrates that local resistance should be supported and US and 
Afghan efforts should be focused on the local level, there are few targeted bottom-up 
programs in Afghanistan (Jones 2009). The lack of progress in the security situation 
has led to what some call questionable strategies, such as US and Afghan engagements 
of local militias to fight the Taliban. Such initiatives are based on the notion of a 
district level counterinsurgency, and to leverage the concept of Arbakai.  
The first local militia program was the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), 
which trained recruits and provided them with uniforms, weapons and a monthly 
salary. The program was terminated in 2008 after heavy criticism of the armament of 
local actors. It was considered a failure as a number of problems were emerged due to 
lack of training and competence, corruption and the minimum of obligation towards 
their duty and the GoA (Cordesman, Burke, Kasten and Mausner 2008:129ff).  
The Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP) was a second iteration of community 
level security programs. APPP started as a pilot project in Wardak Province in the 
Eastern parts of Afghanistan, where villages throughout the province convened Shura-
meetings of local tribal, political and religious leaders. The elders were then to recruit 
and oversee the activities of the local militias. The program aimed at making local 
militias able and willing to guard their neighbourhoods and assist the ANA and the 
ANP in providing security. The plan was, if the model proved successful in Wardak, to 
replicate it throughout the country (Filkins 2009). Though the program was considered 
a success, it came under criticism for its detachment from Afghan government control.  
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Yet another program, the Community Defence Initiative (CDI), was initiated in mid-
2009, and was endorsed by General McChrystal.17
As a refinement of the CDI and the LDI, the Village Stability Program was initiated. 
This program was explicitly built on the notion that the solution to the security 
question in Afghanistan is found at the local level. It was initiated as a bottom-up 
approach to establishing security, governance and development at the local level. The 
Afghan government agreed to the Village Stability Program on the condition that the 
forces would be paid by and remain under supervision of the Afghan Interior Ministry, 
and that they would wear uniforms equivalent of the armed local police (Rubin 2010). 
Karzai demanded that the forces be under the Ministry of Interiors command in order 
to prevent the militias becoming another kind of instability by undermining the 
government (Rubin and Oppel 2010). The new program, which was developed with 
the adjustments made by Karzai, was named the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Karzai 
approved the ALP in July 2010 after negotiations with Petraeus. The MoI would 
provide equipment such as vehicles, radios and light weapons. Unlike the ANP, the 
ALP would not have authority to arrest people and their salary would be more modest 
than the ANP (NTM-A 2010).  
 In this initiative, US forces 
provided support through ammunition, communications equipment, food and training. 
They did however not provide weapons. The program was short lived due to the lack 
of governmental support, and was followed by a fourth program, the Local Defence 
Initiative (LDI). The LDI supported pre-existing armed groups that were resisting the 
Taliban. It aimed to benefit the local community through development aid rather than 
paying individuals for their loyalty (Kilcullen 2010). The LDI-program was funded by 
the US military.  
According to Colonel Wayne Shanks, a spokesman for the NATO command in 
Afghanistan, the goal of local militia initiatives “is to create a situation where the local 
                                              
17 General Mcchrystal served as the American Commander of ISAF and the U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) until 
he was fired for his critical remarks of the US administration during an interview in the Rolling Stones Magazine   
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population is inhospitable to insurgents and where legitimate local leaders can provide 
security and services, ultimately, effectively connecting communities to the Afghan 
government” (as in Ackerman 2009). He also claims that the broader SSR efforts are 
not affected by the community based bottom-up approach to security (ibid).   
4.3 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the empirical context upon which the upcoming analysis will 
be conducted. Afghan NSAAs has in this chapter been decribed as warlords and 
militias. Three approaches within SSR which has been implemented in Afghanistan, 
have been described. Firstly, the DDR-process representing coercive disarmament and 
the realist approach. Secondly, the co-optation of warlords into the central 
government, corresponding to the institutionalist approach. Thirdly, the creation and 
support of local militias in Afghanistan to create a process of socialization, 
corresponding to the constructivist approach. These three initiatives will be analyzed 
in the following chapter in order to find what has been the outcome of the strategies 
chosen in Afghanistan, and to explore the extent to which NSAAs can constructively 
contribute to SSR.  
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5. Analyzing the Afghan Case  
The previous chapter served two purposes. First, it presented and defined two types of 
NSAAs present in Afghanistan, namely warlords and local militias. Second, it outlined 
three concrete initiatives for handling such NSAAs in Afghanistan, namely DDR, co-
optation and the creation of local militias. The following analysis is presented in two 
parts. First, the three initiatives are examined individually in order to analyze the 
outcome of each approach. Second, the results of the first part of this analysis serves to 
highlight the extent to which NSAAs can contribute constructively in SSR. 
5.1 Outcomes of the realist approach  
The realist approach, emphasizing the role of power to address NSAAs through 
incentives and coercion, does not believe in the potential of NSAAs as arbitrators of 
peace (Scheneckener 2009:20). In Afghanistan, this approach is reflected in the 
coercive disarmament in DDR. The DDR program was implemented to disarm illegal 
armed actors, and to control and contain the activities and influence of the NSAAs, a 
typical characteristic of the realist approach. DDR-programs target warlords and 
militias. DDR can arguably be seen as one of the most important parts of SSR in 
Afghanistan, as it contributes to improved security and stability by removing arms 
from the ground, as well as giving combatants other livelihoods. The process of 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of NSAAs in Afghanistan was initiated 
in 2003 through the Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP).  
Japan, as the leading nation on DDR in Afghanistan, was slow in executing any 
disarming efforts. The program was delayed on several occasions, partly due to the 
reluctance of the Ministry of Defence to undertake structural reforms which was set as 
a precondition by the Japanese for releasing the funds (Sedra 2008:127). On the one 
hand it can be argued that the Japanese failed to timely and adequately implement their 
disarming mandate. On the other hand it can be argued that the challenges facing DDR 
were rather political in nature. According to Rubin (2003), the vast majority of 
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Afghans perceived the MoD under Marshall Abdul Qasim Fahim as just another 
factional army. NSAAs were unwilling to submit their arms to what they perceived as 
just another rival faction. Accordingly, it can be argued that reforming the MoD would 
in this case be a precondition for the successful implementation of DDR in 
Afghanistan. Rubin`s findings suggest that the legitimacy of the disarming party can 
be an important factor in the success or failure of DDR processes, and that this is a 
concern that should be addressed in order to succeed in disarmament efforts. However, 
Sedra (2009) has criticized the Japanese for their slow implementation of DDR and 
thus suggest that DDR is a time sensitive issue. This view provides nuance to Rubin’s 
perspective in showing that the successful implementation of DDR requires a careful 
weighing of two priorities. An early start could serve to prevent an up rise of violence, 
while the more time consuming reformation of the disarming party, in this case the 
MoD, would serve to improve the positive impact of the program.   
The pilot phase of the ANBP targeted five Afghan regions: Kunduz, Gardez, Mazar-e-
Sharif, Kandahar and Kabul. Afghanistan is however an ethnically divided and diverse 
society with a history of polarization between ethnic groups, and the intentions behind 
the program was questioned by the groups being disarmed (Isezaki 2009). The realist 
approach is not an approach that creates trust in the first place. By disarming NSAAs 
the government deprives them of their traditional source of security, decreasing 
already weak bonds of trust between the NSAAs the disarming actor, the MoD. 
Moreover, according to Isezaki (2009) and Sedra (2003b), a security vacuum emerged 
as a result of bias in the regional implementation of DDR. Commanders and local 
security actors were successfully disarmed in concentrated areas, but the security 
structures of the central state had been weakened by many years of civil war and were 
consequently unable to fill the emerging security vacuum. As the international 
community also failed to address this issue, the security vacuum was easily exploited 
by other local armed actors unaffiliated with Kabul (Isezaki 2009; Sedra 2003b:8).  
These findings thus suggest that the disarmament of NSAAs as it was implemented in 
Afghanistan appear to have been successful. However, the paramount objective of 
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security was undermined by the state’s institutional weakness and consequent inability 
to follow up the initial success achieved in disarmed areas. This implies that security 
vacuums emerging in the aftermath of disarmament efforts should immediately be 
addressed with suitable means to prevent unwanted actors gaining influence in the 
targeted areas. Furthermore, it can be argued that the persistent insecurity such security 
vacuum implies may foster the perception that the people either must acquire weapons 
themselves or align with NSAAs in order to stay safe, and thereby undermining the 
effective implementation of DDR.   
As illustrated in this thesis, the ANBP found it challenging to address the mid-level 
commanders. Consequently, mid-level commanders continued to constitute a threat to 
the goal of SSR. Why was the program not able to adequately target the mid-level 
commanders? First, mid-level commanders have often benefited financially from war 
and may therefore not see how contributing to a disarmament process would be 
beneficial to themselves. Second, some mid-level commanders are due to their human 
rights abuse records unsuitable for service in the ANA or ANP and were deliberately 
excluded from the reintegration program. Third and finally, mid-level commanders 
have proven to be difficult to map, as they are far less exposed than their commanders 
(Rubin 2003:43; Bhatia and Muggha 2008:133). Nonetheless, the mid-level 
commanders are important actors in the process of securing the people as they are key 
actors in the network of NSAAs. If they are not specifically targeted they may 
continue to constitute a threat to security. Little research has been conducted on how to 
address mid-level commanders and how to establish strategies to deal with them. The 
fact that they were able to avoid the implementation of DDR and to continue their 
business as usual implies that mid-level commanders should be carefully targeted, 
mapped and studied in order to understand how and what incentives and disincentives 
can be utilized to demobilize them. It also suggests that a more network-oriented 
approach would have been beneficial, focusing not only on the top-level commanders 
but also on commanders at other levels within the network. 
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Even though the DDR program led to a high number of disarmed commanders, Sedra 
(2008:128) argues that the program underestimated the strength of the commanders’ 
patronage network and the legitimacy many of them enjoyed in their local 
communities. The Afghan government and the international community incorrectly 
assumed that the patronage links between commanders and their militiamen would 
fade by the provision of economic incentives to disarm. This underestimation enabled 
top-level commanders to surrender only their least loyal troops and their low quality 
weapons while maintaining their power basis and networks (Sedra 2008:140; Isezaki 
2009; Stapleton 2004:128). Incidences like this highlight a key weakness in the 
ANBP: by failing to provide targeted incentives and failing to pair incentives with 
disincentives the ANBP failed to effectively engage commanders. The realist approach 
to NSAAs implies that a combination of coercion and incentives should be provided. 
The case of ANBP did however not provide any disincentive mechanisms, which 
could arguably have contributed to the shortcomings of the program (ibid). The 
Afghan government was unwilling to impose disarmament in fear of that the fighters 
would unite against them (Middlebrook and Sedra 2005). It is conceivable that efforts 
to engage commanders more effectively earlier in the process paired with the 
introduction of credible disincentives would have resulted in greater cooperation from 
the commanders. 
The realist approach reflected in the ANBP relies on incentives alone. NSAAs are 
however likely to choose not to comply if these incentives are not sufficiently 
appealing. If the incentives offered do not provide an improved situation for the NSAA 
they are most likely to choose not to engage in the process. It then becomes clear that 
the government or whoever initiates the program may have to consider providing 
targeted incentives to NSAAs to maximize likelihood of their engagement. Such 
incentives could for instance include access of water and building of schools or it 
could include personal enrichment, depending on the need of the local actor or 
community. However, such a framework of mere incentives may create a situation in 
which NSAAs choose to accept the incentives and receive the corresponding benefits 
while not fulfilling their commitments to DDR, such as proved by the submission of 
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low-grade weapons (Sedra 2008:145). The outcome of the DDR program in 
Afghanistan thus indicates that incentives alone are insufficient tools for successful 
disarmament, particularly regarding the break-up of patronage ties within NSAAs 
networks.  
Focusing solely on coercion, which would be the other extreme option, would 
arguably also be an inadequate tool in isolation as it would require constant application 
of force or the credible threat of the use of force. It can therefore be argued that 
targeted incentives should remain the focal point of DDR efforts but that incentives 
should be paired with a credible set of disincentives in order for DDR to succeed in 
Afghanistan. Furthermore, the success of DDR or SSR in Afghanistan, or in any other 
context for that matter, relies on a consensus among local actors on how to construct a 
proper mix of incentives and coercion tailored to the context in question (Sedra 
2004:220). The appropriate mix would preferably be coupled with the effort to create a 
security buffer to fill the vacuum that in Afghanistan has proven to occur in post-
disarmament situations. The Afghanistan case demonstrates a clear lack of consensus 
on the choice of strategy for approaching NSAAs, a lack of awareness of the need of 
such a strategy and, a comprehension of how different strategies impact on the future 
of NSAAs in Afghanistan.  
The empirical findings of this thesis demonstrate that the DDR efforts in Afghanistan 
have focused mainly on the disarmament and demobilization of NSAAs and to a lesser 
extent on reintegration into society, thereby supporting Strands (2008) findings. The 
long-term benefits of the program have consequently suffered, as reintegration is vital 
to the permanent disengagement of NSAAs from conflict. The Afghan economy 
offered few opportunities of employment for disarmed combatants. With 
unemployment, humanitarian needs follows, underlining the need for a broader focus 
also on reintegration as a part of the economic and political process in Afghanistan. It 
can be argued that DDR should emphasize reintegration in order for DDR to become 
more than just a symbolic and measurable act. Reintegration, in other words, is 
essential in ensuring long-term disengagement of NSAAs from armed actions. As 
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Strand (2008) argues the DDR planning and implementation should be 
“demilitarized”, meaning that there should be more emphasis on the demobilization 
and reintegration and not mainly on disarmament. Focusing on reintegration does not 
mean reintegrating all former combatants into the ANA or ANP. This may be an 
appropriate temporary measure, but goes against the aim of downsizing the national 
military after war. 
Even though there were clear flaws with the DDR process, the ANBP did arguably 
mark a breakthrough in the SSR. It was a large scale and important program initiated 
to improve the security situation, even though it may not have been sufficient to turn 
the tide. The case of DDR in Afghanistan seems to demonstrate a rush for progress, 
disallowing the proper implementation of all aspects of DDR. According to Isezaki 
(2009), short-term benefits were prioritized over long-term objectives, as demonstrated 
by President Bush’s premature call for elections in Afghanistan and fast track 
implementation of premature DDR efforts deemed necessary to hold these elections. 
As Strand (2008:239) finds, one of the lessons learned from the DDR process in 
Afghanistan is the notion that armed actors should be “regarded as possible agent of 
change”, not only as spoilers, and that the program of disarmament needs to be linked 
to the wider efforts of peace building to increase recognition and impact. This lesson 
learned leads us to the conclusion that the underlying realist assumption that local 
actors are not actors of peace is misleading and that the realist approach of coercion is 
unsustainable and insufficient when applied alone.  
5.1.1 Summary 
The above analysis suggests four main weaknesses in the Afghan process of DDR. 
First, the security vacuum emerging in the aftermath of the disarmament of 
commanders was filled by other NSAAs, thus largely cancelling out the initial positive 
effects of disarmament. Second, DDR efforts in Afghanistan have for a number of 
reasons neglected the reintegration aspect, and thus undermined the long-term effects 
of DDR. Third, Afghan DDR demonstrates a clear unwillingness to apply 
 47 
 
disincentives for non-compliance, enabling NSAAs to benefit from economic 
incentives while failing to adhere to their responsibilities. Fourth, in failing to deal 
with mid-level commanders, DDR in Afghanistan failed to sever patronage links and 
the networks of NSAAs. 
Despite these signs of weakness, DDR in Afghanistan also demonstrates some 
achievements. The large amount of weapons collected represents DDR’s main 
achievement along with meeting the DDR benchmark that allowed the electoral 
process to proceed. However, the failure of Afghan DDR in breaking up NSAA 
networks, the security vacuum filled by NSAAs, along with insufficient efforts of 
reintegration represents the primary legacy of ANBP. 
 
5.2 Outcomes of the institutionalist approach  
Institutionalism as a strategy to address NSAAs builds on the notion that states and 
non-state actors have some concurrent interests (Nee 2003:31). Institutionalism in the 
Afghan case is demonstrated by the states’ desire to control the warlords by offering 
governmental positions, and that the warlords are attracted to the offer based on a 
perception of that doing so would strengthen their power. The state and the warlords’ 
interests are concurrent in the sense that they are both potentially attracted to the same 
idea of co-optation, despite their diverging motivations for seeking co-optation. 
According to Mitrany (1975) the functionalist interpretation of the institutionalist 
approach suggests that external actors, in this case the NATO and its allies in 
Afghanistan, can shape local actors preferences by offering incentives like well-paid 
and influential governmental positions. The external party serves in this sense to 
facilitate co-optation by for instance negotiating an agreement or mediating between 
the state and the NSAAs. In Afghanistan, the international community has the power 
to serve as such an external actor in applying pressure on or mediating in co-optation 
processes.  
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The formation and management of a network of relationships with commanders, local 
leader and warlords characterize the institutionalist approach to NSAAs. The 
institutionalist theory presented by Schneckener (2009) predicts that co-optation of 
warlords will change their motivation and behaviour. The institutionalist approach thus 
builds on an underlying conviction of that NSAAs are not motivated by ideology. The 
institutionalist approach suggests that they are rather motivated by political demands 
and economic desires. Institutionalism moreover builds on the underlying perception 
that armed actors are important agents in peace- and state-building processes. 
Warlords are viewed as powerful and potentially essential actors in state building 
efforts as they have earlier functioned as proto-states within their territory.  
President Karzai confirmed the power of local power brokers by including many of 
them in the interim administration, giving them political positions after the Emergency 
Jirga in 2002. Karzai chose to build his power basis on local warlords by offering them 
access to formal power structures. The Karzai administration largely avoided armed 
confrontation with warlords and criminally linked strongmen by accommodating them 
and including them into the central government. Karzai argued that the co-optation of 
warlords would advance national reconciliation. However, it may be argued that the 
decision was driven by concerns of alienating power brokers. Several provincial 
governors were transferred to similar posts in other provinces if they had performed 
inadequately, rather than being removed from office (Marten 2009; Middlebrook and 
Sedra 2005). This empirical evidence implies that the fear of a violent reaction 
superseded the imperative of good governance.          
The inclusion of warlords largely served to expand their political and financial control 
from their provincial basis to also including access to the formal power structures in 
Kabul. This thesis has found that warlords have managed to retain many of their 
former illegal connections even after they were included into the central government, 
which has given them the opportunity to manipulate both formal and informal power 
structures to serve their individual interests (Lister 2007; Strand 2008). For instance, 
the processing and smuggling of opium is largely controlled by powerful strongmen 
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with close connections to the government. This suggests that the co-optation of 
warlords has led to a consolidation of organized crime (Blanchard 2004; Shaw 2006). 
The increasingly influential warlords and the consolidation of crime suggest that the 
co-optation of warlords into the Afghan government has not produced the desired 
effect. Most sources seem to agree that it may initially have been necessary to co-opt 
warlords in order to control them but that co-optation not necessarily represents a 
sustainable long-term solution for peace and stability. 
As Abelsen (2010) argues, it is necessary to adapt SSR-initiatives to the real power 
structures that are present on the ground.18
A challenge in the institutionalist approach is the creation of loyalty between NSAAs 
and the central government. Even though warlords and commanders are included into 
 In Afghanitan, societal structures are 
constructed across informal relations, ethnic affiliations, and corruption. Warlords play 
a significant role in this society, and it would appear natural to somehow incorporate 
them into the official state structures. According to Abelsen, Dostum has for instance 
been rendered harmless by being co-opted into the government. The local Afghan 
system based on personal relations between powerful men and strategic personal 
alignments is an intricate political game that can be difficult to comprehend for 
foreigners, but failing to relate to this pre-existing system will prevent the creation of a 
lasting solution for stability (Abelsen 2010). However, the notion of that the co-
optation of warlords into the government may strengthen their criminal networks and 
lead to a loss of legitimacy for the central government presents a dilemma in the co-
optation of warlords. The intstitutionalist approach does however predict that warlords 
by virtue of socialization will demonstrate a change in motivation and behaviour, and 
as a consequence will seize to be warlords (Schneckener 2009:24). The co-optation of 
warlords can in this sense in the long run transform warlords into representatives for 
the state possessing political legitimacy (Giustozzi 2009:8). 
                                              
18 Personal Interview in Oslo on 17th of June 2010 
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the government, socialization does not take place automatically. The loyalty of 
NSAAs to the central government that emerge as a result of co-optation is merely 
superficial, and based on the economic incentives offered to the NSAAs. However, 
alignments are known to change swiftly in the Afghan society, and loyalty goes in 
layers first to the Afghan himself, secondly to his family, clan, and lastly to 
Afghanistan as nation (Abelsen 2010: Dahl 2010).19
As illustrated in this thesis, to co-opt power brokers may seem as rational and even 
inevitable. However, the process of co-opting warlords will always run the risk of 
including actors that undermine the efforts of the government. Furthermore, the local 
population may not react positively to what they perceive as illegitimate people being 
given high-ranking positions in the central government. This may in turn contribute to 
weakening the legitimacy and public support of the government. However, when it 
comes to who is considered legitimate representatives or not, an important aspect is 
that it is difficult to find anybody that is untouched by the war that has ravaged 
Afghanistan for the past 30 years. Most actors, through their shifting alliances, have 
participated in larger or smaller operations where they have acted in ways that are 
perceived as illegitimate by one party or another (Knotten 2010).
  Afghan commanders change 
loyalty as a matter of convenience, as has been illustrated historically by the numerous 
warlords changing sides with the turn of events. Loyalty is to Afghan warlords a 
matter of accessing benefits, and loyalty ties lasts only until someone offers superior 
benefits. Economic incentives can create loyalty, even though it may only be 
temporarily as it risks to be outbid by a more appealing offer. The risk in the 
Afghanistan case is that when the international community withdraws, the Afghan 
government will appear weak and warlords will again shift alliance out of 
convenience. 
20
                                              
19 Personal Interview in Oslo  on 18th of  June 2010 
 Unveiling the 
history of each warlord and satisfying everybody regarding their perception of 
legitimacy is in this respect an impossible task. The result is a situation in which what 
20 Telephonic Interview on 22nd of June 2010 
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some perceive as illegitimate represent the government. Karzai´s power basis was built 
on the accommodation of warlords, and he would most likely not have been able to 
position himself as he has if he had not struck deals with the most powerful warlords. 
It may be difficult to comprehend the significance of such deals for non-Afghans, as 
co-opting warlords into the government may have been unavoidable in order to keep 
them under control. As Dahl (2010) notes “a bandit is better when he is your bandit”, a 
point certainly demonstrated by the Karzai government. 
Informal power and informal networks matter in Afghanistan. Formal institutions has 
largely been absent at both provincial and district levels, increasing the importance and 
influence of the informal system of the Afghan society. In order to deliver progress on 
security, reconstruction and counternarcotics the Afghan society requires an ability to 
manage relationships, resources and influence beyond the formal structures of the 
state. In many cases, warlords has employed informal power and rules as well as their 
personal networks to control their respective provinces. Some warlords have in fact 
proven quite successful in the provision of security and reconstruction by such 
informal channels, as for instance Atta Mohammad Noor (Mukhopadhyay 2009:20). 
However, these informal system structures stands exposed to a range of problems such 
as corruption, inefficiencies and human right abuses. The success of warlords such as 
Noor is in this respect the exception rather than the rule. Nevertheless, the Noor-case 
illustrates that warlords do have potential as governance actors.   
The former UN Secretary General`s Special Representative, Lakhdar Brahimi, has 
argued that the power possessed by warlords made it impossible to eliminate them 
during the initial period of the international engagement and that steps that could 
conceivable alienate them should be avoided (Sedra 2003b:14). Brahimi suggests that 
actions on transitional justice and on weeding out warlords should be delayed until the 
government is strong enough to handle it. However, ignoring the crimes committed by 
warlords and keeping incompetent warlords in the government may ultimately serve to 
exacerbate the Afghan security situation and undermine the legitimacy of the 
government (ibid). Co-optation appears in this respect as a conceivable option in the 
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initial phases of state consolidation, as warlords may be too powerful for the 
government to handle by other means. However, although this analysis suggest that 
co-optation of warlords may be necessary in the initial phases of state building as a 
matter of gaining control over the informal societal structures, the co-optation of 
warlords in the long run may undermine the legitimacy of the government by the 
manipulation of formal power structures. 
5.2.1 Summary 
Institutionalist theory suggests that NSAAs are in fact potential actors of security 
governance, and that NSAAs by a process of co-optation will undertake a motivational 
and behavioural change. However, in Afghanistan the result predicted along the lines 
of this logic has only marginally proven to be the case. This indicates that the 
instituionalist approach does not necessarily produce the behavioural and motivational 
change predicted by institutionalist theory. Co-opted warlords appear to have been 
able to manipulate formal and informal power structures, which has led to a 
consolidation of organized crime. Even though some warlords has proven able to 
provide services and security this has been the exception rather than the rule, as most 
co-opted warlords has left the government with a stained reputation. However, the fact 
that some warlords has been able to gain political legitimacy through their provision of 
security and services supports the notion of that NSAAs can potentially contribute 
constructively in the provision of security. 
This analysis has illustrated that the co-optation of warlords in the initial phases of 
state consolidation and SSR may be difficult to avoid, as warlords often are powerful 
actors with considerable impact on the much important informal societal structures. 
However, unless warlords undergo a process of motivational and behavioural change 
they are likely to maintain their military legitimacy while failing to develop political 
legitimacy. Maintaining illegitimate actors in high-ranking positions of the 
government will undoubtfully in the long run severely undermine the states quest for 
legitimacy and good governance. 
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5.3 Outcomes of the constructivist approach  
The constructivist approach to NSAAs emphasizes social interaction, and is based on 
the concept of learning through cooperation. The process of learning is reciprocal and 
develops into the institutionalization of a set of common values shared by both parties 
involved in the cooperation. The constructivist approach is based on the notion that 
interaction leads to the shaping of a common identity and interest of the involved 
actors (Adler 2002; Jackson 2007; Schneckener 2009).  
By founding an emerging security system on the traditional providers of security, this 
approach believes that the system will be tailored to the local context and thereby 
standing the best chance of sustainability. Accordingly, the government will strengthen 
its capacity by being able to provide security in the provinces, and the ANA and ANP 
will have the opportunity to become stronger and more capable. Through cooperation 
and interaction the security agents on both levels, local and national, would become 
more intertwined, more adapted and functional. Like the institutionalist approach, the 
constructivist does also build on an underlying conviction that NSAAs are potential 
governance actors and not solely spoilers in SSR.    
In Afghanistan, the constructivist approach has been implemented through the attempt 
of supporting local armed groups to fight the Taliban, and of creating security forces 
that are based on the model of a pre-existing security system, namely the Arbakai. 
These initiatives would, according to the logic of constructivism, create a security 
system based on pre-existing structures. This system would represent a bottom-up 
approach, and would according to theory in the long run develop into a common 
normative foundation shared by the government and the NSAAs. The pre-existing 
security structure in Afghanistan is based on NSAAs providing security to the 
population in their respective communities. It appears logical in this respect for the 
government to build security systems based on the local security system of NSAAs. 
However, efforts of building security on local structures in Afghanistan, such as the 
ALP program, do not appear to have been motivated by a conviction of that bottom-up 
approaches produce more sustainable security structures. Rather, these initiatives 
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appear to have been motivated out of necessity, as the ANA and ANP have proved 
incapable of providing security throughout the country (Isezaki 2009; Thompson 
2010). This has caused the Afghan government to pursue such a constructivist 
approach only in most insecure parts of the country, and thus failing to acknowledge 
the possible positive spillover effects of pursuing similar approaches also in the less 
insecure parts of the country.  
In Pasthun areas, many villages have based its security on the shura-controlled 
Arbakai structure. Today, many traditional policing institutions such as the Arbakai 
still exist and have the potential of being engaged to fight the Taliban. As we have 
seen, local militias have not only been engaged in the fight against the Taliban; the 
government has also thrown its support behind the construction and maintenance of 
similar local militia structures throughout the country. Some of these attempts have 
been unsuccessful and discontinued, such as the ANAP. The ANAP armed and 
requested local groups to fight the Taliban, and thus undermined the previous efforts 
of DDR. Other programs have however been successful. According to Kilcullen 
(2010), examples of successful initiatives have been the APPP and the LDI. However, 
in spite of improving the security situation in some areas, the challenges appear to 
arise when the programs are transferred to new areas.        
According to Jones (2010), local militia programs have been particularly beneficial in 
the South, by helping local leaders secure their areas, while it in other areas has had 
not positive effects at all. This suggests that the Afghan diversity makes it difficult to 
find and initiate one single solution throughout the country. Different provinces have 
different needs, calling for different strategies that are each tailored to their respective 
provinces. It appears as if the creation of militias resembling the Arbakai has proved 
effective in areas operating with shuras and jirgas, such as the Pasthun areas of 
Afghanistan. This again suggests that the constructivist approach has had some 
positive impact in Afghanistan, but that building local militias face better prospects in 
areas who have characteristics that resemble the Arbakai-structure. In Afghanistan, 
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there is no one size fits all, and the successful implementation of local militias’ 
initiatives demands a custom fit approach, tailored to the local needs and conditions.  
Successful implementation of the constructivist approach relies on the ability to tailor 
the initiatives to the local conditions on the ground. In order to engage local actors 
they must be convinced that the engagement benefits the NSAAs themselves and in 
some cases their local communities (Strand 2008:258). An essential aspect of the 
constructivist approach is accordingly the government’s ability to address local 
grievances. Engagement with local actors can facilitate the identification of the needs 
and desires of the population, and the constructivist approach can in this respect be 
essential in the identification of an appropriate model that is tailored to the conditions 
on the ground, and that adequately addresses the needs of the people.     
Some of the local defence programs, such as the ANAP, sent a dangerous political 
message: the program was inspired by a pasthun security structure, the Arbakai, and 
many of the actors participating in the program were pashtuns. The government, 
supported by NATO and its allies, was rearming local actors in the pashtun areas while 
simultaneously executing disarmament efforts of DDR in the north (Isezaki 2009). As 
Sedra notes “this served to factionalise the SSR process along ethnic lines” (Sedra 
2004:220).   
Most sources seem to agree that local militia programs could have negative effects in 
the long run as it could possible serve to empower old leaders or create new 
commanders. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the Afghan tradition of shifting 
loyalty out of convenience is compatible with the local militia programs, as these local 
militias could easily end up turning against the international forces and the Afghan 
government. It is also conceivable that an Afghan system based on local security 
militias would be particularly vulnerable to swift and unwanted changes. If the Afghan 
government and the international forces are perceived as weak, as they may well be 
when the international troops start to withdraw, local leaders may choose to shift their 
loyalty away from the central government (Barfield 2010). Many local leaders still 
have strong ties to their old structures and could easily withdraw from the 
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governmentally created system and return to their pre-2001 systems (ibid). To prevent 
such an outcome efforts must be made either to dismantle local militias after their 
objectives have been completed, and ANA and ANP has become stronger and more 
capable to serve its mandate, or to construct control mechanisms to prevent local 
militias from disengaging from governmental control. There are currently no strategies 
or control mechanisms for dealing with local militias in the aftermath of such 
programs.  
The most recent program, the ALP, has improved its design through the lessons 
learned from similar programs. However, the concept of the ALP appears to be quite 
different from what the US Special Forces had in mind. The community militia 
program that was suggested by the US was based on the idea of a bottom-up approach, 
meaning that the militias would enjoy some degree of independence from the central 
government (rather relying on the Shuras). Karzai did however not approve this 
bottom-up and decentralized design, as he feared it would entail losing control over the 
militia. Karzai insisted that the leaders within the program would be chosen by the 
Ministry of Defense (MoI) rather than by the Shura (Rubin and Oppel 2010). MoI 
control of the ALP could be seen as a step in the right direction with regards to 
improving governmental control, or as a mechanism of state control. However, this 
centralization could expose the program to the risks of government inefficiencies and 
corruption. For instance, the selection of leaders could be based on nepotism and bribe 
instead of proficiency and suitability.   
The constructivist approach reflects an underlying belief that SSR and peace building 
efforts should be based on bottom-up approaches. Such approach would by providing 
mechanisms and programs tailored to local circumstances be beneficial to a 
sustainable end result. Bottom-up approaches are known to be successful.21
                                              
21 For example, Uganda has sought to rebuild itself from the bottom up by empowering local councils and Somaliland 
has experienced a relatively successful bottom-up process of state-building (Kaplan 2009). 
 Successful 
cases of centralized and top-down efforts, coming from governments supported by 
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weak institutions, is much harder to find. Top-down approaches suffer from the risk of 
neglecting crucial characteristics and determining factors of local realities. It can be 
argued that the USSR and in more recent times the US and the international 
community initially tried to bring about changes in Afghanistan based on a top-down 
approach (Fange 2010:2ff). This US and international top-down approach was 
characterized by efforts to strengthen the government in Kabul while fighting 
insurgents in the provinces. These efforts have neglected to acknowledge that the 
Taliban in many cases gained the upper hand by operating based on local dynamics. 
The Taliban remained in close contact with local communities and managed in many 
cases to gain the support of local communities by acknowledging and addressing their 
local grievances (Jones 2009). As Cordman notes, “like politics, all 
counterinsurgencies are local” (Cordsman et al. 2008:129). Considering this statement, 
in addition to the limits of the ANA and the ANP, it is not surprising that US 
commanders and the Afghan government has tried to find alternative ways of reducing 
the pressure on the formal troops. By realizing how the Taliban profited from its 
ability to operate on local dynamics and the value of engaging local actors, the US has 
by local militia programs replaced the centralized strategy with a strategy of 
decentralized security efforts. The Afghan government has however been unwilling to 
adopt this decentralized strategy unconditionally, as illustrated by the Karzai’s 
unwillingness to decentralize security responsibility under the ALP.      
Bottom-up approaches and cooperation with local actors may give the government the 
ability to address local grievances and to prevent communities from turning against the 
governmental efforts to stabilize the country. Despite the challenges and perils of 
engaging local security forces it might be the only path to provide security until the 
ANA and the ANP are strong and effective enough to do the job on its own. Until the 
Afghan government and the justice system are functioning at a proficient level, risking 
some militias turning into threats may be worth taking in the long run, as failing to 
address security vacuums on one side and relying on the weak security institutions on 
the other may prove to undermine any efforts of stabilizing or securing the Afghan 
society. Attempts of creating local security forces are however not absent significant 
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risks, and as Bhatia argues “when considering employing or utilizing these local 
militias, both international and national initiatives and programmes need to be 
evaluated in terms of whether these actions will transform community militias into 
strongmen militias” (Bhatia 2008:91). Creating local militias could cause unwanted 
effects, such as militias shifting loyalty after having been trained and equipped or the 
empowerment of old commanders. Such unwanted outcomes would seriously 
undermine the SSR process in Afghanistan.  
As illustrated in this thesis, the Arbakai system is common only in some parts of 
Afghanistan. Duplicating such structures throughout the country may therefore prove 
to be a time-consuming affair. Furthermore, creating local militias based on Arbakai 
structure may prove unsuitable for non-pasthun areas, as people may be unaccustomed 
to communicating with and relying on local control mechanisms such as the jirga. The 
Arbakai structure appears effective mainly in areas demonstrating strong tribal 
characteristics, as is the case in Southeastern Afghanistan (Jones 2010). This again 
underlined the importance of adopting security efforts that are tailored to local 
circumstances, conditions and security systems. Duplicating Arbakai-type security 
systems to parts of the country unfamiliar with tribal structures may prove to 
undermine SSR in empowering warlords and their militias.  
5.3.1 Summary 
The constructivist approach addresses NSAAs by creating security models similar to 
those within which NSAAs operate, and aims to create security strategies based on a 
bottom-up approach. Constructivist theory predicts that involved actors will intertwine 
and develop a set of common values through a process of interaction and cooperation. 
In Afghanistan, the constructivist approach has been pursued by the creation of local 
militias based on the Arbakai-model. Such initiatives has been successful in some 
cases, and can enable the government to map local grievances and to address them 
accordingly. Until the ANA and the ANP develops adequate capacity to provide 
security throughout all of Afghanistan, the creation of local militias may very well be 
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the only option. However, relying on a one-size fits all in a diverse case such as 
Afghanistan appears to be counterproductive in some instances, as largely different 
conditions on the ground requires strategies and programs that are each tailored to the 
specific conditions to which they are applied. The constructivist approach has largely 
proven to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, local militia programs have proven 
useful in filling security gaps left by the inabilities of the ANA and the ANP. On the 
other hand, local militia programs are exposed to the risk of empowering militia 
leaders who in turn may use the militias for their own self-interest. This analysis finds 
that in order to counter such unwanted outcomes, control mechanism should be 
implement or strategies to dismantle the local militias after they have served their 
purpose should be developed. The efforts to engage tribes and local security structures 
should not come at the expense of fragile government structures rather they should 
serve to strengthen them.  
5.4 To what extent can NSAAs contribute 
constructively in SSR?  
This chapter has so far presented the outcomes of three differing strategies in dealing 
with NSAAs. The previous analysis has illustrated that the realist approach created a 
security vacuum that the government was unable to fill due to institutional weakness, 
and that the DDR efforts were insufficient to target all combatants and to follow up the 
disarmament with reintegration. The findings from the institutionalist approach 
suggests that co-optation in the initial phase of state consolidation may be inevitable in 
Afghanistan. However, the fact that NSAAs has not necessarily undergone the 
motivational and behavioural change that theory predicted, has resulted in NSAAs 
being able to manipulate formal state structures, which has led to a consolidation of 
organized crime. The findings from the constructivist approach suggest that NSAAs 
may have the potential in contributing constructively to the provision of security, and 
that the local engagement allows the government to map local grievances and to 
address them accordingly. However, such initiatives as the one presented within the 
constructivist approach is not without jeopardy, as they risk empowering local leaders. 
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The findings also suggest that in complex societies as Afghanistan, constructivist 
approaches must be tailored to the conditions on the ground.   
The outcome of these three strategies implemented in Afghanistan suggests that there 
is no obvious answer to whether NSAAs are mere spoilers or potential contributors in 
the process of SSR. However, the analysis of the outcomes presented in this thesis 
suggests that NSAAs do have the potential to contribute constructively to SSR in 
Afghanistan. It does so however on a set of contextual preconditions.  
The findings of this analysis suggest that NSAAs may have the potential of 
contributing constructively in SSR if they are subject to checks and balances through 
governmental or local control mechanisms. For instance, as demonstrated by the 
institutionalist approach in Afghanistan, NSAAs may continue their illegitimate 
activities after being co-opted into the central government, and they have demonstrated 
a will and ability to manipulate the formal structures to serve their self-interests (Lister 
2007; Strand 2008). Such manipulation of formal structures takes undermines the 
legitimacy of the central government. Furthermore, if an accommodating framework is 
constructed based on incentives to address NSAAs, the evidence presented in this 
thesis suggests that incentives should be balanced with coercion. Adhering to this, if 
NSAAs would perform inadequately according to the goals of SSR, mechanisms 
should be created to remove NSAAs from power or to dismantle their security 
providing abilities. The outcomes of the constructivist approach in Afghanistan appear 
to support this view. In order to prevent old leaders from being empowered and to 
prevent local militias from turning against the government, control mechanisms should 
be implemented and strategies to dissolve militias after their have served their purpose 
should be developed. Developing control mechanisms could also be useful in altering 
the challenge of creating loyalty between the state and the NSAA. In sum, both the 
constructivist and the institutionalist initiatives suggests that the constructive potential 
of NSAAs in security governance presupposes that effective control mechanisms are 
in place. 
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Both the constructivist and the institutionalist approach both perceive NSAAs as 
potential contributors in SSR. Both approaches also emphasize that a motivational and 
behavioural change is required to produce the desired effects. Absent such changes, 
warlords fail to gain political legitimacy and will consequently remain warlords, and 
the local security structures would not become intertwined and produce a set of norms 
and values common for both warlords and the central governing agencies and 
institutions. The findings of this thesis suggest that behavioural and motivational 
change and the merging of norms and values are not necessarily required preconditions 
for short-term benefits. However, in the long run, failing to change the nature of 
warlords would most likely undermine the stability and sustainability of the system in 
undermining the legitimacy of the state. In other words, to ensure the constructive 
long-term role of warlords in security governance, appropriate control mechanisms 
should be developed and applied to warlords failing to pass through the behavioural 
and motivational transformation institutional and constructivist theory predicts. 
Furthermore, strategies to disengage warlords that would not perform adequately 
should be developed.   
The realist approach failed in Afghanistan to address NSAAs efficiently. Many 
commanders resisted the governmental efforts to disarm the country, undermining the 
process by handing in old low-quality weapons, and by sending their least loyal 
combatants (Sedra 2008; Isezaki 2009). Failing to target incentives to the requirements 
on the ground and failing to apply disincentives for non-compliance may have 
undermined the opportunity to engage NSAAs effectively. Another finding when 
analysing the outcome of the realist approach was the inability to address the security 
vacuum emerging after the disarmament efforts, which was related to the institutional 
weakness of the Afghan government and the international community’s lack of focus 
on the consequences such vacuum could cause (Isezaki 2009). This finding suggests 
that when the government and its security institutions are weak, addressing NSAAs as 
mere spoilers may be challenging. It may be challenging for the government to disarm 
NSAAs and in presenting itself as a credible actor that will provide security after local 
commanders have handed in their weapons. Furthermore, by ruling out the possibility 
 62 
 
that NSAAs may have a potential as local governance actors the government may be 
risking a lost opportunity to create a viable security system while taking advantage of 
potential resources on the ground. In sum, it may be more favourable for the 
government to deal with NSAAs as potential governance actors, particularly in an 
initial period while strengthening the capacity of the ANA and the ANP.  
As illustrated above, DDR processes are difficult to implement for weak governments. 
However, weak governments can successfully implement a realist approach if NSAAs 
undergoing a process of DDR see the clear linkage to the overall peace building 
process. NSAAs need to have enough trust in the process and in the actors 
implementing the disarmament to give up their arms and influence. In the Afghan 
case, neither trust nor understanding has been generated (Strand 2008:258).  
Even if an implementation of a realist approach would be successful, with a 
subsequent creation of a centralized security system that would become strong and 
stable, it would not necessarily be adequate in Afghanistan. Such centralized system 
could arguably reinforce the gap between de jure and de facto state. Jones (2010) 
argues for a combination of centralized and decentralised security efforts in 
Afghanistan: 
“During Afghanistan’s most recent stable period, that of the Musahiban dynasty 
(1929-78) the Afghan rulers Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah, and Daoud Khan – who 
established a republic in 1973 – used a combination of centralized and decentralized 
strategies that are worth emulating today” (Jones 2010:125).  
During the Musahiban dynaty, Kabul provided security in the urban areas and along 
main roads, while local communities established and maintained security in the rural 
areas with the assistance of the central government. As Giustozzi (2009a) argues, a 
long-lasting stability will likely involve a combination of top-down institutionalization 
and bottom-up co-optation and socialization of local leaders. Having a de jure 
centralized system and a de facto decentralized system only reinforces illegitimate 
power structures rather than reinforcing the elected government in Kabul. Therefore, it 
may be argued that it would be beneficial to take advantage of NSAAs in SSR. 
Focusing exclusively on top-down strategies would be efficient in countries that have a 
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history of strong central institutions, while it in countries like Afghanistan may not 
produce the intended outcome (Jones 2010).22
Giustozzi (2009b) describes how bottom-up strategies are implemented by the Taliban, 
who aims at co-opting and socializing local leaders by playing on their grievance 
against the Afghan government and the international forces, and by offering economic 
incentives. Such bottom-up approaches implemented by the Taliban, illustrate how the 
Taliban has been able to reach out to the population by ways of many of the same 
strategies that are available to the government and the international forces. Through 
these bottom-up efforts, the Taliban has in many areas been able to gain the upper 
hand, suggesting that bottom-up strategies are an important aspect of Afghan security 
governance (Jones 2010). This implies that the international community would benefit 
from revising the strategy for managing NSAAs to match the effectiveness of 
Taliban’s bottom up-strategy. Revising the strategy would mean to expand the 
initiatives and programs within the constructivist and institutionalist approach to 
include other efforts than today. Such initiatives could also be implemented in 
relatively secure parts of the country in hopes of producing positive spillover effects 
into less secure parts of Afghanistan. It appears as if the Afghan fragmented society 
makes it difficult to neglect the impact of local security providers. Warlords and 
militias have throughout history largely ruled Afghanistan in a decentralized manner. 
This thesis suggests that in order for the Afghan government to provide security to the 
state and its population, ways must be found to bring aspects of these traditional 
structures into SSR in order to foster linkage between the traditional and modern 
security structures. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Berman (2010) draws a parallel between the state building efforts in Afghanistan and 
those undertaken by Louis XIV´s during his reign of France in the 17th century, where 
responsibility for security lay with local nobility that would today have been 
                                              
22 Countries with a history of strong central institutions that has undergone top-down strategies of state building 
includes Japan after the Second World War and Iraq after 2003 
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characterized as warlords and militias. As part of the French state building, the King 
put the local power brokers at service for the French state. They were offered benefits 
and positions in the administrative centre of Versailles, enabling Louis XIV to watch 
over them while separating them from their respective power bases. Their economic 
advantages and their social status were in this manner taken care of. In Afghanistan, 
the challenge is how to deal with warlords and militias, and the example and parallel 
drawn by Berman (ibid) suggests that co-optation through the offering of incentives is 
sufficient in dealing with NSAAs. However, this thesis has found that the co-optation 
of warlords in Afghanistan has led warlords to gain influence over formal structures 
while continuing to retain their informal connections, leading to a consolidation of 
crime (Blanchard 2004; Shaw 2006).  
Furthermore, this thesis suggests that the fear of a violent reaction has superseded the 
imperative of good governance, consequently leading to the loss of legitimacy for the 
government. Incentives alone may lead NSAAs to behave in ways that impact 
negatively on government legitimacy, as illustrated by the co-optation of warlords in 
Afghanistan. Coercion alone will in the long run become costly and will lead to chaos 
if not paired with efforts of stabilization and the rebuilding of authority. This implies 
that both carrots and sticks have to be used in dealing with NSAAs. By offering social 
and economic benefits that are targeted and carefully designed for its intent as 
dispense for NSAAs to stop fighting, with the threat of being crushed in war if they do 
not accept, they can be integrated in the government.  
Central security institutions, such as the ANA and the ANP should be strengthened in 
order to be able to provide security. Such strengthening and capacity building takes 
time, and it may therefore in the short-run prove productive to utilize the potential in 
decentralized security structures (NSAAs). Taking advantage of the potential in 
NSAAs to provide security may not only be costly in financial terms for the 
government, but also in terms of honour and principle as NSAAs often have a record 
of human right abuses and shady business. However, it may be a cost worth paying, at 
least initially, while in the long-run warlords that fail to perform should arguably be 
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addressed to emphasize good governance and legitimacy. Accordingly, one may claim 
that acknowledging that there is a need to exploit the constructive potential in warlords 
and militias would be necessary, and that NSAAs are important actors in SSR. 
The international community tend to assume that power in Afghanistan ought to be 
exercised from Kabul. Yet the real influence in Afghanistan has traditionally rested on 
tribal leaders and warlords (Bacevich 2009). NSAAs can arguably contribute to 
accomplish the objectives of SSR in a cheaper and more effective manner than US and 
international forces can achieve in isolation. One may therefore claim that the basis of 
the strategy towards NSAAs in Afghanistan should adopt strategies of decentralization 
and outsourcing of security provision, by offering the right mix of incentives and 
disincentives to local leaders who will collaborate with the government in keeping 
terrorists out of their territory. NSAAs contribution can go a long ways in peace and 
security processes if carefully planned, designed and supervised by control 
mechanisms. The task may simply be to find the appropriate ways to foster synergy 
between traditional and untraditional security actors.      
What do these findings say about how to deal with NSAAs? The realist, institutionalist 
and constructivist approaches are not mutually exclusive, and they can and have been 
employed alongside each other as strategies for dealing with NSAAs. However, the 
objectives of these strategies have been severely obstructed by the lack of coherent 
strategy, awareness and understanding of how the three strategies impact on NSAAs. 
Successful handling of NSAAs relies on that the characteristics and motivation of 
NSAAs are closely mapped, and that the appropriate strategy for approaching the 
NSAA is chosen. Diagnosing the problem, so to speak, is crucial yet difficult in a 
complex landscape such as in Afghanistan. Choosing the appropriate strategy is a 
matter of identifying the type of actor, either a spoiler or a potential governance actor.   
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If an armed actor is, in Stedman’s (1997) terms, a total spoiler, a realistic approach of 
coercion appears to be the only viable option.23
In addition to the choice of strategy itself, a number of other factors influence the 
outcomes of the initiatives aiming to deal with NSAAs. First, it matters whether the 
initiative is implemented either before conflict erupts, during its course, or in the 
aftermath. Second, the characteristics of the actors in charge of the initiative matter, 
whether it is the government, its army, or international institutions. Third, the 
characteristics of the NSAA itself and the resources such as outside support and 
capable leadership it possesses matters (Schneckener 2009: 24). 
 Co-optation or attempts of 
socialization would in such cases be useless, making defeat the only way to hinder 
them from damaging the efforts of bringing security to a country. However, as found 
in this thesis, after defeating or disarming spoilers, reintegration still remains 
important in order to prevent them from falling back into their previous patterns. 
Reintegration would be possible after disarmament as they per se would seize to be an 
armed actors, nonetheless, reintegration should preferably take place in non-security 
occupations. An armed actor who has become a part of an armed group as a matter of 
financial motivations can be brought into settlement, either by co-optation or through a 
long-term strategy of socialization. In most instances, a combination of these strategies 
is probably beneficial. Most importantly, awareness about which strategy is used and 
what outcomes the strategy chosen can entail is required for successfully dealing with 
NSAAs. 
The findings of this thesis suggest that scientific engagement with NSAA still faces 
several challenges that have been neglected in predominant strategies. Furthermore, 
that external actors and governments often lack knowledge about the armed groups 
                                              
23 “Total spoilers pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority and hold immutable preferences: that is, 
their goals are not subject to change. Total spoilers are led by individuals who see the world in all-or-nothing terms and 
often suffer from pathological tendencies that prevent the pragmatism necessary for compromise settlements of 
conflict. Total spoilers often espouse radical ideologies; total power is a means for achieving such goals as the violent 
transformation of society” (Stedman 1997:10) 
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they are dealing with, the range of options they have at their disposal, and the possible 
outcomes and consequences of each approach. Improving the knowledge about such 
issues would assist governments and international actors in making the most of the 
potential in NSAAs as constructive contributors in SSR.    
This paper has explored NSAAs potential in serving as constructive contributors in 
SSR, finding that NSAAs may play an important role in the state-led provision of 
security. As illustrated in this thesis, this perspective emphasises efficiency rather than 
legitimacy, as many NSAAs has proven to influence the governments’ reputation 
negatively. However, creating a security system that builds on local security structures 
may in the eyes of many be perceived as legitimate, as it would reflect a bottom up 
approach based on the realties on the ground. Nevertheless, efficiency may initially be 
what is most important in Afghanistan in the short run to stabilize the country, while 
the long run may require a reformation of the security sector, placing emphasis on 
values such as legitimacy and good governance. As argued by Strand (2008), the 
opportunity of using local communities and actors has been missed in Afghanistan. 
The embedded option has not been recognized. Rather, the fear of NSAAs as spoilers 
of the efforts of create peace and stability has outshined a deeper understanding of the 
mechanisms at play in the Afghan society (Strand 2008:258). The findings of this 
thesis support this argument, and claims that there is a potential in NSAAs to 
contribute constructively in the provision of security. This is particularly the case in 
societies such as Afghanistan, consisting of weak security institutions incapable of 
providing security to the state and its people, and with a history of complex local 
security systems made up of powerful local leaders. It may be challenging to make 
NSAAs security actors serving the state. However, they could at a minimum serve as 
security guarantors – providing a guarantee for law and order. Such role would utilize 
the potential in NSAAs to contribute constructively in the provision of security. 
This thesis asks about the extent to which NSAAs can contribute constructively in 
SSR. The short answer to this question is that NSAA are in fact potential constructive 
contributors to SSR processes, but that this potential is conditional. It is conditional in 
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the sense that not all NSAAs have this potential. In sum, NSAAs can be categorized in 
three broad categories: 
The first category are those NSAAs who are unwilling to participate in SSR regardless 
of the incentives and disincentives presented by the state or other external actors, often 
as a matter of ideological convictions and motivation. These NSAAs are, by definition, 
total spoilers who undermine both the legitimacy of the state and its monopoly on the 
use of force, thus representing a major challenge to peace and security. Total spoilers 
warrant and require powerful means, best suited for realist approaches such as 
coercive disarmament. 
The second category of NSAAs is those who are willing to participate in SSR as a 
matter of gaining access to the incentives offered by the state, but who are unable or 
unwilling to undergo the behavioural and motivational change predicted by 
institutionalist and constructivist theory. By granting NSAAs who fail to discontinue 
illegitimate activities, such as drug trade, access to formal state structures, state 
legitimacy may suffer as a result. Despite this obvious barrier to their constructive 
potential in SSR the inclusion of such NSAAs may in fact provide a range of short-
term benefits to SSR. First, including such NSAAs allows the state to refocus its 
resources to cope with the total spoilers-category, which have no potential whatsoever. 
Second, including such NSAAs precludes their insurgency against the state. Third, 
including such NSAAs allows the state to monitor their actions and behaviour. As this 
second category of NSAAs simultaneously contributes to security through SSR and 
challenge the legitimacy of the state, the central government must develop and 
implement control-mechanisms and strategies for neutralizing the challenge these 
NSAAs represent. 
The third category of NSAAs is those who are both able and willing to participate in 
SSR, and who undergo the behavioural and motivational change predicted by 
constructivist and institutionalist theory. By gaining political legitimacy such NSAAs 
demonstrate substantial long-term potential as constructive contributors to the 
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provision of security while challenging neither the legitimacy of the state not its 
monopoly on the use of force. 
5.5 Summary 
This thesis finds that NSAAs has the potential to contribute constructively in the 
provision of security. Using traditional structures in state building appear to be 
particularly useful when governments lack the ability to provide security throughout 
the country. Even though NSAAs would not undergo the motivational and behavioural 
change predicted by theory, NSAAs would in the short run still be benefactors in the 
provision of security. To profit from the security potential in NSAAs control 
mechanisms would have to be implemented or long-term strategies developed to 
disengage NSAAs if they complete their purpose or if they should not perform 
adequately. Engaging NSAAs in stabilizing the country could lead to synergy effect 
between traditional and centralized security structures, allowing an improved 
governmental capacity to provide security in a security system tailored to the Afghan 
context. Such system would also be more efficient in mapping local grievances and 
concerns, to be able to address them accordingly. As illustrated in this thesis, 
employing the potential in NSAAs as constructive contributor in the provision of 
security would entail, in the short run, to ignore the effect co-optation or socialization 
could have on the governments’ legitimacy, rather prioritizing efficiency in providing 
security. Taking advantage of the potential in NSAAs as providers of security may 
stain the governments’ reputation. However, it may be a cost worth paying, at least 
initially, while the formal security structures are strengthening. Accordingly, one may 
claim that an acknowledgement that NSAAs have the potential of contributing 
constructively in SSR would be necessary. 
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6. Conclusion – implications for theory 
and practice 
The objective of this study has been to explore the extent to which NSAAs can 
contribute constructively in SSR by analyzing and drawing lessons from different 
approaches to NSAAs in Afghanistan. This thesis has investigated the outcomes of 
three specific cases of SSR-initiatives within the case of Afghanistan, each 
representing a different strategy for coping with NSAAs as they are presented by 
Stedman (1997). These three strategies are in turn affiliated with a particular strand of 
international relations theory, which provides a logical and theoretical foundation for 
analyzing and understanding how each strategy and its associated initiatives are 
intended to impact on NSAAs and the security situation in Afghanistan. The three 
theories presented diverge on the issue of whether or not NSAAs have the potential to 
play constructive roles in the provision of security. Realism declines this notion and 
suggests that national government must develop strategies for neutralizing NSAAs. 
Both institutionalism and constructivism, on the other hand, embraces the notion of 
NSAAs as potential benefactors that can and should to some extent be integrated into 
security processes and SSR. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis presented the methodological considerations and challenges 
related to this research project. Chapter 3 served two purposes. First, it outlined a 
theoretical framework that explains the underlying logics of the three strategies for 
handling NSAAs in Afghanistan. Second, it defined the key concepts of this study. 
Chapter 4 presented the empirical substance of this study. It briefly describes and 
discusses the characteristics of two types of NSAAs in Afghanistan, namely warlords 
and militias. Further, it presents how three initiatives for handling NSAAs have been 
implemented in Afghanistan, each representing its respective theoretical logic. Chapter 
5 analysed the outcomes of the three initiatives presented in Chapter 4, upon which the 
following discussion on the extent to which NSAAs can contribute constructively in 
SSR was based.  
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Two main conclusions can be derived from the analysis presented in this thesis: 
1. NSAAs are potential constructive contributors in SSR. This potential relies first 
and foremost on the NSAAs will and ability to contribute, and secondly on 
whether or not it in contributing undergoes a behavioural and motivational change. 
This thesis has demonstrated that NSAAs can yield significant benefits in SSR. The 
potential in NSAAs would be rendered useful only if the NSAA would be willing to 
contribute to the state-led efforts to enhance security within the given territory. This 
willingness could be influenced by applying incentives and disincentives for non-
compliance. Both institutionalism and constructivism suggest that NSAAs would 
undergo a process of motivational and behavioural change by virtue of co-optation and 
socialization respectively. This analysis has however proven that this change may not 
always occur. NSAAs that are subject to socialization or co-optation but that fail to 
undergo a behavioural and motivational change may nevertheless serve the overall 
purpose of SSR, as it by providing security allows the state to focus its resources on 
the crucial strengthening of key security institutions. The strengthening of security 
institutions can thus in the short run take precedence over concerns of legitimacy. 
However, a set of control mechanisms and strategies for removing those NSAAs who 
have outplayed their benefactor role or who are unable to commit to the process must 
be established. Those NSAAs that would undergo the motivational and behavioural 
change that theory predicts could be constructive contributors in the long run by 
gaining political legitimacy.  
2. Institutional weakness in post-conflict societies presents significant barriers to the 
successful implementation of realist strategies towards NSAAs. The Afghan case 
of DDR illustrates in this respect the need for developing alternative and 
complementary strategies for handling NSAAs. 
This thesis has found that the realist approach, represented by coercive disarmament in 
DDR, produced a security vacuum that the government due to its institutional 
weaknesses was unable to fill. This implies that formal governmental institutions, 
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especially those pertaining to security such as police and armed forces, must be at a 
certain operational level in order for the government to be able to provide security 
after NSAAs has given up their weapons. Furthermore, the government must come 
across as a credible security actor in order for targeted incentives and disincentives to 
be effective. All in all, the DDR processes in Afghanistan demonstrate that weak 
security structures of states seriously challenges the objectives of DDR, and thus 
suggest that alternative strategies for handling NSAAs should be developed and 
implemented. The findings of this thesis does not in any manner minimize the 
importance of DDR in post-conflict societies, rather it suggest that the benefactor role 
of NSAAs should not be underestimated.  
I sum, exploiting the potential of NSAAs in providing security allows for a bottom-up 
and decentralized approach to security governance. Including NSAAs could be vital in 
the initial period of state consolidation, as it allows the government to strengthen its 
capacity for providing security to the state and its people. Moreover, engaging with 
NSAAs allows the government to address local grievances, to monitor their activities, 
and to create a security system reflecting the conditions on the ground. 
6.1 Theoretical implications 
International relations theories have proven useful for understanding the underlying 
logic and perceptions within the different strategies in dealing with NSAAs. The 
combination of realism, institutionalism and constructivism provides a fruitful 
theoretical framework for explaining the strategies available in addressing NSAAs 
either as spoilers or as potential providers of security. The analytical framework 
proposed in this study provides a way to facilitate an understanding about how to 
address NSAAs and why to address them in such manner, and predicts a certain 
outcome of each approach. The findings of this thesis suggest that realist, institutional 
and constructivist theories are complementary concerning NSAAs, a comprehensive 
approach to NSAAs requires lending bits and pieces from all three theories. The 
theoretical framework gives an example of how international relations theories can be 
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used to assist scholars in studying strategies in dealing with NSAAs within SSR in a 
more precise and systematic manner.    
6.2 Political implications 
SSR programs must recognize the presence of NSAAs in the earliest stages of 
planning and program design, and develop strategies for addressing NSAAs in SSR 
activities. Management of NSAAs requires awareness about and a nuanced 
understanding of their characteristics, dynamics and structures in order to determine 
the appropriate mix of approaches. Essential to successful handling of NSAAs in SSR 
is a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches, and a tailored mix of 
coercive disarmament, co-optation and socialisation. The realist, constructivist and the 
institutionalist approaches are arguably all measures that could have contributed to 
shifting the “rules of the game” in Afghanistan if applied within a coherent strategy 
based on knowledge and understanding of the local context. Such coherent and 
knowledge based strategies could contribute to a more efficient security by bridging 
the gap between de jure and de facto security structures and by creating synergy 
effects between traditional and modern systems of governance. By exploring the 
strengths and weaknesses of realist, institutionalist and constructivist approaches to 
NSAAs in Afghanistan this thesis provides insight useful to future development of 
strategies for managing NSAAs in post-conflict SSR.  
6.3 Future prospects 
This research has offered a contribution to the important debate on the role of NSAAs 
within peace building and security sector reform. It has contributed to the increased 
knowledge about NSAAs as constructive contributors in the provision of security and 
on how to develop strategies to deal with NSAAs within SSR. The study should 
therefore provide a good foundation for further research on NSAAs within peace and 
state building. However, several interesting questions still remains unanswered: how to 
create effective and viable control mechanisms, for instance, remains an important 
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issue. In order to further increase the knowledge on how to handle NSAAs in SSR one 
could either perform a similar analysis on a different case, or perform a comparative 
analysis for instance between Afghanistan and another NSAA-troubled state such as 
Sudan. 
 
. 
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Appendix I – List of Interviewees 
Bjørn Robert Dahl, Colonel, Senior Staff Officer for lessons learned in the Norwegian 
Armed Forces, and former Senior Mentor for 1st Brigade 209 ANA Corps, ISAF. Personal 
Interview 18.6.2010  
Ivar Knotten, Leutenant Colonel, Former PRT Commander (des 2009-june 2010). 
Telephonic interview on 22.06.10  
Kenji Isezaki, DDR-expert who led the Japanese DDR unit in Kabul from 2003-2005. 
Personal interview in Tokyo on 16.12.2009 
Mark Sedra, Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) 
with extensive experience on security issues in Afghanistan. Telephonic interview on 
17.7.2009   
Roy Abelsen, Colonel, former Senior Mentor in OMLT 1st Brigade, 209th. Personal 
Interview in Oslo on 17.06.2010 
Shinichi Kobayashi, Assistant Director, Afghanistan Section of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Japan. Personal Interview in Tokyo on 09.12.2009  
Dr. Thomas Barfield, president of the American Institute for Afghanistan Studies. 
Telephonic Interview on 21.06.10 
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